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In light of the growing consensus surrounding the need for the emergence of 
Democratic Developmental States in Africa, this thesis analyses the concept within the 
context of two Southern African states: Botswana and South Africa. In this regard, it 
critically analyses the extent to which Botswana and South Africa can be considered 
to be Democratic Developmental States by making use five benchmarks of a 
Democratic Developmental State. It does so by firstly exploring and defining the 
concept and theory of the Developmental State as well as the concept of the 
Democratic Developmental State. Secondly, the thesis surveys the contributions 
made by five key authors, namely, Richard Sklar, Adrian Leftwich, Mark Robinson, 
Gordon White and Omano Edigheji, to the topic of the Democratic Developmental 
State and outlines the following five benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental 
State: Development-Oriented Political Leadership; Effective and Well-Insulated 
Economic Bureaucracy; Developmental Success; Consolidated Electoral Democracy; 
and Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process. 
 
Thirdly, the five benchmarks are used to critically analyse whether Botswana and 
South Africa can truly be regarded as Democratic Developmental States. In this 
regard, the thesis finds that neither state fully exhibits all five outlined benchmarks of 
a Democratic Developmental State: While Botswana exemplifies most of the five 
outlined benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State, this thesis finds that South 
Africa still has a long to go before it can be regarded as a Democratic Developmental 
State. In this manner, this thesis provides possible recommendations which will assist 
both Botswana and South Africa towards becoming fully-fledged Democratic 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. Background Statement 
In light of the failure of neoliberalism in Africa, which took the form of the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs), African leaders have begun to turn towards the Democratic Developmental 
State model as a panacea for its democratic and developmental concerns (Edigheji, 
2010: vii). Given Southern Africa’s over-reliance on extractive industries, its 
developmental failures as well as its democratic challenges, countries in Southern 
Africa are especially being drawn to the Democratic Developmental State model 
(Lawrence, 2013: 48). Such a model is viewed by these countries as having the 
potential to improve its democratic institutions as well as its competitive base 
(Lawrence, 2013: 48). However, given Southern Africa’s limited progress made in 
areas such as democratisation, the provision of civil and political rights as well as 
social development, only four out of the 15 Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) members are viewed as having the potential to establish Democratic 
Developmental States (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa [EISA], 
2008: 12). Included in the four possible SADC member states are Botswana and South 
Africa, which this thesis will explicitly focus on, as well as Mauritius and Namibia (EISA, 
2008: 12).  
 
1.1.1. Botswana as an African Democratic Developmental State 
In 1885, prior to its independence, Botswana was publically declared a British 
protectorate and went by the name of Bechuanaland (Mogalakwe, 2006: 66). In 1961, 
the British colonialists formally discarded their plans to incorporate Bechuanaland into 
the Union of South Africa and began the process of decolonisation by way of 
constitutional negotiations with key nationalist actors (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001: 14; Proctor, 1968: 61). Botswana’s first elections based on universal 
suffrage was held on 1 March 1965 and Botswana formally gained independence from 




Following its independence, Botswana’s economic growth has been more positive in 
contrast to other sub-Saharan African countries (Meyns, 2010: 44). Since 
independence, Botswana’s per capita income had risen from US$ 60 per year in 1966 
to US$ 2583 in 1999 to an astonishing US$ 6470 in 2008 (Meyns, 2010: 44). From 
1965 up until 1995, Botswana was regarded as, “the fastest growing country in the 
world” (Beaulier, 2003: 231). Additionally, while it was previously considered to be one 
of the poorest countries in Africa, Botswana was ranked by the World Bank as an 
Upper Middle Income Country (Meyns, 2010: 44). Coupled with Botswana’s 
exceptional growth rates was its commitment to democratic governance: In this regard, 
Botswana is often cited as, “the longest-surviving democracy in Africa” (Sebudubudu 
and Botlhomilwe, 2010: 65). Furthermore, Botswana has been one of the few African 
countries which had not succumb to a military regime, war or political violence and 
was considered to be, “an election success story in Africa and beyond” (Sebudubudu 
and Botlhomilwe, 2010: 65; Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 33). For these 
reasons, Botswana is commonly depicted as “an African miracle”, an “African growth 
economy” as well as a successful African Democratic Developmental State (Routely, 
2012: 11). 
 
1.1.2. South Africa as an Emerging Democratic Developmental State 
The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 and comprised of four colonies: Orange 
Free State, Transvaal, Natal and the Cape Colony (The Presidency, 2015). Following 
a policy of racial ‘segregation’, the Union of South Africa passed several laws which 
denied black South Africans the opportunity to benefit from South Africa’s economic 
growth and development (Grenville, 2005: 764). South Africa’s policy of racial 
segregation and discrimination became institutionalised in 1948 with the coming into 
power of the National Party (NP) (Clark and Worger, 2013). The system of laws and 
policies of racial segregation came to be known as ‘Apartheid’ which lasted from 1948 
until 1994 when it was dismantled following South Africa’s first democratic election 
(Clark and Worger, 2013).   
 
Since its first democratic election in 1994, the concept of the Developmental State has 
received considerable attention by the South African government (Turok, 2008: 3). 
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The South African government’s commitment to pursuing a Democratic 
Developmental State has been constitutionally enshrined and articulated at the African 
National Congress (ANC) General National Council Meeting in 2005 as well as at its 
52nd National Conference in Polokwane in 2007 (African National Congress [ANC], 
2005; ANC, 2007). In 2009, the ANC publically declared its intention to pursue a 
developmental state in its 2009 Election Manifesto wherein it firmly stated that, “The 
developmental state will play a central and strategic role in the economy. We will 
ensure a more effective government; improve the coordination and planning efforts of 
the developmental state by means of a planning entity to ensure faster change” (ANC, 
2009). In addition, Chapter 13 of the South African National Development Plan (NDP) 
2030, titled ‘Building a Capable and Developmental State’, is dedicated to the pursuit 
of the Democratic Developmental State (Republic of South Africa, 2012). Therein it 
acknowledges the need for the state to assume both a developmental and 
transformative role in the pursuit of socio-economic development (Ayee, 2013: 262; 
Republic of South Africa, 2012: 407). In this regard, South Africa is exceptional in that 
few other countries have made a public commitment to the construction of a 
Democratic Developmental State (Ayee, 2013: 267). Commentators regard South 
Africa’s commitment to building a Democratic Developmental State as both ambitious 
and noble (Gumede, 2014: 3).  
 
According to Vusi Gumede, there is currently an on-going debate concerning whether 
or not South Africa can be regarded as a Democratic Developmental State (Gumede, 
2014: 4). Many scholars have offered the following views on the matter: Alan Hirsch 
(2013), for example, noted that one can only begin to assess the possibility of a 
Democratic Developmental State in South Africa once its democracy is fully matured 
(Gumede, 2014: 4). According to William Gumede (2009), the pursuit of a Democratic 
Developmental State in South Africa is “still a work in progress” (Gumede, 2014: 4). In 
addition, Ben Turok (2008) claims that while South Africa cannot yet be considered as 
a Democratic Developmental State, it has made several inroads in this regard 
(Gumede, 2014: 4). Given these views and its commitment towards establishing a 
Democratic Developmental State, South Africa has commonly been considered an 




1.2. Relevance of the Study 
Given the enormous amount of attention which the concept of the Developmental 
State has received in recent years and in light of the Democratic Developmental State 
being increasingly regard as a solution to Africa’s democratic and developmental 
deficits, the thesis explores the applicability of the concept within Africa. Furthermore, 
as the title “Democratic Developmental States in Southern Africa: A Study of Botswana 
and South Africa” suggests, this thesis will focus on the Democratic Developmental 
State model in Southern Africa, by examining the Democratic Developmental State 
within the context of Botswana and South Africa.  
 
1.3. Research Questions 
The research undertaken in this thesis attempts to address the following two 
questions: 
I. Is Botswana truly a Democratic Developmental State? and,  
II. Has the Emerging/Aspirational Democratic Developmental State of South 
Africa been able to successfully construct a Democratic Developmental 
State? 
 
1.4. Research Design and Methodology 
In assessing the two research questions above, this thesis performs a critical analysis 
of Botswana and South Africa, and analysed is whether they are truly Democratic 
Developmental States. In so doing, this research study will survey the literature 
produced by key authors on the Democratic Developmental State in order to identify 
five benchmarks of such a state which the thesis will use to assess these two Southern 
African states. The methodological approach of this thesis is based on a qualitative 
analysis of the concept of the Democratic Developmental State. Therefore, the 
research component of this thesis draws on library resources and secondary sources 
which involves a desktop literature review on the body of literature that focuses 
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explicitly on the Democratic Developmental State as it relates to Botswana and South 
Africa. 
 
1.5. Outline of the Chapters 
The thesis is divided into six chapters: Chapter One defined in this chapter provides a 
background discussion that sets the framework of the thesis. Chapter Two provides 
the conceptual and theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter begins by 
exploring and defining the concept of the Development State as found in East Asia. In 
this regard, it also discusses the accompanying theory of the Developmental State 
and outlines the model of the Developmental State. Secondly, Chapter Two briefly 
discusses the concept of the Democratic Developmental State by defining the 
concepts of democracy and development and exploring the relationship between 
these two concepts and thereafter defining the concept of the Democratic 
Developmental State. Chapter Three of the thesis provides a brief review of literature 
on the Democratic Developmental State and seeks to outline five benchmarks of such 
a state. It does so by assessing the contributions made by the following five key 
scholars: Richard Sklar, Adrian Leftwich, Mark Robinson, Gordon White and Omano 
Edigheji. In this regard, close attention is paid to the manner in which these authors 
have reconciled and incorporated both the concepts of democracy and development 
into their individual Democratic Developmental State models. 
 
Chapter Four provides a critical analysis of Botswana by using the benchmarks 
outlined in Chapter Three and concludes by providing possible recommendations. 
Chapter Five also critically analyses the extent to which South Africa can be regarded 
as a Democratic Developmental State by making further use of the five benchmarks 
outlined in Chapter Three and concludes with possible recommendations. Finally, 
Chapter Six provides a substantive conclusion by summarising the main arguments 






Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
2.1. The Developmental State as in East Asia 
2.1.1. Definition of the Developmental State 
The concept of the Developmental State has often been used as a generic term 
describing states that have achieved rapid economic growth and development through 
the intervention of strong, efficient bureaucracies (Kim, 2009a: 6; Stubbs, 2009: 5). 
The concept is founded on the assumption that there exists a mutually beneficial 
relationship between state actors (bureaucrats) and non-state actors (private business 
firms) where the state intervenes in the market to foster economic growth and 
development and pursue society-wide developmental goals (Woo-Cummings, 1999).  
 
The concept of the Developmental State was first used by Chalmers Johnson (1982) 
to describe the role that the Japanese state assumed in its outstanding and 
unforeseen post-war economic recovery (Johnson, 1982). Since then, the concept of 
the Developmental State has been closely associated with the economic policies 
pursued by certain East Asian states in the twentieth century with the Japanese state 
being a prime example (Caldentey, 2008: 28). Furthermore, scholars have labelled 
Developmental States who have originated out of the East Asian experience during 
the period of the 1950s to the 1980s as ‘Classical Developmental States’ (Chang, 
2010: 83). Classical Developmental States most closely ascribe to the ideal type of 
the Developmental State Model – that of industrial-based economies, high economic 
growth rates and professional and autonomous state bureaucracies (Routely, 2012: 
11). Developmental States who fall under this category include Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan (Routely, 2012: 11).   
 
This thesis will adopt the following operational definition of the Developmental State 
provided by Leftwich in which he argues that, “Developmental states may be defined 
as states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity 
at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit 
developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and 
direction of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of 
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both” (Leftwich, 1995: 401). The Developmental State has been characterised by 
Leftwich as a “transitional form of the modern state” which is typically found in late 
industrialising countries (Leftwich, 2000: 167). This leads to Leftwich’s next point in 
which he asserts that Developmental States are not static: the successful pursuit of 
economic growth may in turn alter particular political forces which may bring about 
further political and economic change (Leftwich, 2000: 168).  
 
2.1.2. The Theory of the Developmental State 
The theory of the Developmental State was introduced in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Gilpin, 2001: 316). According to Robert Wade, the theory underscores the 
importance of, “the idea of ‘a centralised state interacting with the private sector from 
a position of pre-eminence so as to secure development[al] objectives’” (Wade, 1990). 
The theory argues that the rapid economic growth and development that was 
experienced by certain East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
was a result of the role played by an active, interventionist state in directing 
development (Hundt, n.d.). The theory is positioned between a liberal open market 
economy and a centrally-planned model. Its unique position suggests that it is neither 
capitalist nor socialist in nature, but rather brings together private capital with state 
supervision (Woo-Cummings, 1999: 2).  
 
 The Neoliberal Account of the East Asian Miracle 
The theory of the Developmental State emerged as a critique of the neoliberal 
orthodoxy in accounting for the rapid industrialisation and economic development of 
the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) in East Asia during the 1970s and 1980s 
(Bolesta, 2007: 105; Gilpin, 2001: 316). Broadly defined, neoliberal economists argued 
that the success of East Asia’s post-war industrialisation resulted from the ability of 
the market to function free of undue state interference (Gray, 2015: 4). In this manner 
neoliberals asserted that market forces through open trade, rather than government 
policies, were responsible for the rapid economic development in East Asia (Gilpin, 
2001: 321). The East Asian experience of the 1970s and 1980s is often used by 
neoclassical economists as a further tribute to the neoclassical growth model (Gilpin, 
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2001: 321). The concept of ‘neoliberalism’ refers to a branch of neoclassical 
economics which asserts that economic growth and development can be best 
achieved through limited state intervention in the market (Wade, 1992: 271; McGowan 
and Nel, 2002: 353). A global consensus towards neoliberal policy prescriptions 
emerged in the 1970s in response to the failure of Keynesian economics to prevent 
recession following the oil crisis of 1973 (van Vuuren, 2013: 20). Consequently, 
following the demise of communism and centrally-planned economies at the end of 
the Cold War in 1989, neoliberalism became the dominant politico-economic 
orthodoxy globally (Tarc, 2009: 9).  
 
According to Ha-Joon Chang, the underlying logic behind the neoliberalist argument 
is comprised of two closely-linked components: one being an ‘economic’ component 
and the other a ‘political’ one (Chang, 1999: 184).  The ‘economic’ component 
proposes “wholesale market liberalisation” – this entails, ‘getting the prices right’ 
(Chang, 1999: 184). In this manner, ‘getting’ means allowing prices to determine their 
correct levels, and ‘right’ refers to the relative prices which are established in free 
domestic and international markets (Wade, 1992: 271). For neoliberals, ‘right prices’ 
are the prices which prevail in domestic and international markets, free of any state 
regulations (Chang, 1999: 185). According to Ray Kiely (1998), ‘Right prices’ can only 
come about when the market has reached a state of equilibrium, i.e. when supply and 
demand are balanced. Neoliberalism maintains that the global economy will reach a 
state of equilibrium only if the market is allowed to function without state interference 
(Kiely, 1998: 130).  On the national level, ‘getting the prices right’ requires a domestic 
product to operate with little or no restraint or regulatory oversight from the state 
(Chang, 1999: 185).   
 
At the international level, ‘getting the prices right’ requires opening up markets by 
removing barriers to trade such as trade protectionist policies, and exercising 
comparative advantage (Chang, 1999: 185). In this regard, a country’s particular factor 
endowments must determine its comparative advantage (Chang, 1999: 185). 
Neoliberalism claims that by exercising comparative advantage, states will specialise 
in producing goods where they have a lower opportunity cost and where they are most 
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efficient and competitive (Kiely, 1998: 130). Nation states can only exercise their 
comparative advantage under conditions of more or less open competition (Kiely, 
1998: 130). For developing countries, neoliberalism suggests that by exercising 
comparative advantage in their abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, their 
economies can grow (Chang, 1999: 185). Developing countries are therefore 
recommended to concentrate their production in labour-intensive industries while 
staying clear of capital-intensive sectors (Chang, 1999: 185).    
 
The ‘political’ component of the neoliberal argument, on the other hand, calls for the 
removal of politics from the formulation and implementation of economic policy 
(Chang, 1999: 185). According to neoliberals, any political meddling within economic 
policy ultimately results in the formulation of economic policy that solely benefits elite 
minority interests to the detriment of the majority (Chang, 1999: 185). In this regard, 
neoliberals argue that socially harmful consequences will occur if the pursuit of self-
interest by individuals is not wholly guided by market forces (Chang, 1999: 185). 
 
According to neoliberals, economic growth is a natural product of capitalist economies 
(Wade, 1992: 271). In order to create an environment conducive for growth, the 
government is tasked with providing a list of selective public goods which include: 
infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, rule of law and education (Wade, 1992: 271). 
According to neoliberals, what accounted for the East Asian economic success was 
the provision of public goods and the adoption of the following three neoliberal policy 
prescriptions: Firstly, East Asian governments facilitated free trade by removing 
barriers to their markets (Gilpin, 2001: 317). Secondly, East Asian governments limited 
government intervention in the economy in order to allow the markets to operate 
efficiently (Gilpin, 2001: 317). Thirdly, East Asian governments implemented export-
led growth policies (Gilpin, 2001: 317).   
 
 Developmental State Theory’s Criticism of the Neoliberal Account 
In comparison to the neoliberal school of thought, the theory of the Developmental 
State provides a markedly different account of the East Asia economic recovery (Kim, 
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2009b: 384).  Developmental State theorists challenged the neoliberalist’s framework 
by arguing that the economic success of the NIEs was a result of the central role 
played by the state in guiding economic development (Gilpin, 2001: 317; Krugman, 
1994: 62). Therefore, contrary to advocates of neoliberalism, Developmental State 
theorists argue that it was the ‘visible hand’ of the state rather than the ‘invisible hand’ 
of the market which spurred on rapid economic growth in East Asia by channeling 
capital to selective sectors which it deemed would yield the most profits and bring 
about optimal social benefits (Movahed, 2014; Gilpin, 2001: 317).  
 
The theory is based on the assumption that the economies of the NIEs suffered from 
the effects of “late, late industrialisation”, one of which is market failure (Gilpin, 2001: 
318). For Developmental State theorists, the global market is not based on more or 
less open competition and therefore does not naturally tend towards equilibrium as 
neoliberalism suggests (Kiely, 1998: 130). According to the theory, the global market 
is founded on unequal competition as a result of unequal labour productivities between 
developing and developed countries (Kiely, 1998: 130). Unequal labour productivities 
has arisen due to the advantage which developed countries enjoy in terms of having 
well-functioning infrastructure, established markets and access to the latest research 
and development. As a result, developed countries are able to acquire the most 
efficient methods of large-scale production (Kiely, 1998: 130).  
 
As a result, developing countries wishing to industrialise and develop face unequal 
competition both domestically (in terms of protecting their local products from cheaper 
imports) as well as internationally (where they face barriers to entry which inhibits them 
from breaking into the global market) (Kiely, 1998: 130). In practice, even when 
exercising their comparative advantage in abundant, cheap labour, developing 
countries cannot out-compete the advanced technology of developed countries (Kiely, 
1998: 130). The preponderance of market failure among less developed economies, 
according to the theory, required a strong interventionist state to prevent such failures 
and facilitate economic development (Gilpin, 2001: 318). For this reason, 
Developmental State theorists insist that governments of developing countries should 
intervene in the markets by adopting industrial policies which supports local producers 
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attempting to enter the global market and protects them at home in their domestic 
markets where they must compete against established transnational corporations 
(TNCs) (Kiely, 1998: 130).  
 
Therefore, the theory argues that certain East Asian countries were able to rapidly 
industrialise and grow their economies precisely because they ignored  the neoliberal 
policy prescriptions (Kim, 2009b: 384). Instead, they were able to achieve rapid 
economic growth and development by channeling capital into selective business 
industries and thereby ‘getting the relative prices wrong’. The allocation of subsidies 
by East Asian governments was also used as a tool to discipline these select 
industries. Consequently, close ties were formed between the state and the private 
sector (Kim, 2009b: 384; Öniş 1991: 112).  
 
Subsidies were meant to compensate for the inability of national firms to compete in 
international markets (Wade, 1992: 286). It also sought to move the present industrial 
structure higher up the value-added chain to include more technologically advanced 
methods of production (Wade, 1992: 286). According to Developmental State 
theorists, subsidies can achieve economic growth faster than if it were left to free 
market forces alone (Wade, 1992: 286). Therefore, the theory suggests that the use 
of subsidies assisted in the creation of an industrial and economic structure which 
would have not otherwise occurred (Gilpin, 2001: 317). In this regard, certain East 
Asian states ignored the suggestion made by neoliberals that late developers should 
focus on production in labour-intensive sectors and instead used the state to subsidise 
selective industries to help develop and grow capital-intensive manufacturing sectors.  
 
In this regard, the Developmental State adopted a “sticks and carrots” approach to its 
allocation of subsidies to firms whereby it outlined stringent performance standards 
and disciplined firms by rewarding firms that performed well with more subsidies and 
withholding subsidies from those that did not perform well (Öniş, 1991: 112). 
Furthermore, the use of performance criteria in the allocation of subsidies helped to 
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increase the level of productivity within business firms, thereby making it more 
attractive to potential investors (Amsden, 1989: 145).   
  
The use of state subsidies also resulted in changing the process whereby relative 
prices were determined (Öniş, 1991: 112). By creating price distortions, the 
Developmental State could better channel economic activity towards greater 
investment (Öniş, 1991: 112). Therefore, in stark contrast to neoclassical development 
theory and its preoccupation with ‘getting the prices right’, Developmental States 
deliberately got the prices ‘wrong’ in securing the correct amount of investment in 
strategic sectors (Öniş, 1991: 112). According to Alice Amsden, East Asian 
governments typically distorted the exchange rate as well as the real interest rate in 
order to bring about industrialisation (Amsden, 2000). With regard to the exchange 
rate, Amsden notes that late industrialisers desired a low exchange rate when 
exporting goods, and therefore opted to relatively devalue their currency in order to 
stimulate exports as part of their export-led growth strategy (Amsden, 1989: 144; Gala, 
2005: 1). Furthermore, Amsden notes that governments of Developmental States were 
able to distort the real interest rate by controlling nationalised banks and financial 
institutions (Amsden, 2000). In this regard, the government established multiple prices 
for loans and allocated heavily subsidised rates of interest on long-term credit (also 
referred to as “policy loans”) to select industries (Amsden, 1989: 144).  
 
2.1.3. The Developmental State Model 
Leftwich’s Developmental State model is predicated on the assumption that political 
factors are the dominant variable which shapes both the concept and the potential 
success of Developmental States (Leftwich, 2000: 154). According to Leftwich, politics 
has been essential in providing the impetus for the emergence of such states as well 
in shaping its developmental trajectory (Leftwich, 2000: 154). Political factors which 
have prompted the emergence of Developmental States include, “nationalism, 
ideology and a wish to ‘catch up’ with the West” (Leftwich, 2000: 154). Leftwich’s 
Developmental State model is mainly founded on the experiences of East and South 
Asia countries but also incorporates the experiences of African countries, namely, 




According to Leftwich (2000) Developmental States share the following six key 
features: Firstly, they are led by incorrupt political and bureaucratic elites who are 
driven and committed to economic growth and transformation (Leftwich, 2000: 160). 
Furthermore, the political-administrative interface is unique in the Developmental 
State as it is characterised by one in which, “the politicians reign and the bureaucrats 
rule” (Johnson, 1981: 12). In this regard, politicians in the Developmental State give 
up their traditional policy-making role to the bureaucrats and only oversee that 
developmental policies are crafted in line with the needs of citizens on which the 
stability of the political system is based (Wade, 1990: 26). Politicians, therefore, are 
mainly tasked with maintaining the political stability and the relative autonomy of the 
state (Wade, 1990: 26).   
 
The second feature of the Developmental State is that of autonomy. Leftwich argues 
that the key factor is for both the elites and for government institutions to operate with 
a high degree of autonomy (Leftwich, 2000: 161). Autonomy refers to the freedom of 
the state to pursue its national objectives without being overly controlled and dictated 
to by societal pressures (Leftwich, 2000: 161). While the Developmental State 
operates with a considerable degree of autonomy, it is not completely separated from 
society (Leftwich, 2000: 161). Peter Evans (1995) describes this autonomy as 
“embedded autonomy”, which is defined as the uniting of well-developed 
bureaucracies with the surrounding social structure, which includes both state and 
non-state actors (Leftwich, 2000: 162; Evans, 1995). These linkages and relationships 
between the bureaucracies and the society further assists and informs the 
Developmental State in shaping, defining and pursuing its developmental goals.  
 
Thirdly, Developmental States are characterised by the presence of an effective and 
well-insulated bureaucracy (Leftwich, 2000: 162). An effective and well-insulated 
bureaucracy must have the necessary capacity to formulate and implement coherent 
developmental policies and in so doing should be shielded from pervasive political 
pressures (Johnson, 1987: 142). The presence of “pilot agencies” to oversee and 
coordinate the process of development is an important element in this regard 
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(Leftwich, 2000: 162). Examples of pilot agencies include Japan’s Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), South Korea’s Economic Planning Board 
(EPB), and Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau (IDB).     
 
Fourthly, Developmental States are characterised by having typically weak and 
subordinate civil societies (Leftwich, 2000: 163). According to Leftwich, the 
experiences of East Asia have suggested that a weak civil society is a prerequisite in 
order for a Developmental State to emerge (Leftwich, 2000: 164). Fifthly, these states 
have the capacity to effectively manage private economic interests (Leftwich, 2000: 
164). Consequently, they are able to control the effect that foreign and national capital 
has on the state’s development process (Leftwich, 2000: 164).  
 
Sixthly, Developmental States for the most part are authoritarian in nature and are 
therefore characterised by an uneasy mix of legitimacy, performance, repression and 
poor human rights track records (Leftwich, 2000: 160). In this regard, Johnson argues 
that key conditions such as “political stability” and “predictability”, which are much 
needed for the success of any Developmental State, can only be achieved and 
maintained through an authoritarian form of government (Johnson, 1987). 
Consequently, Developmental States have been deemed unattractive by Western 
liberal standards due to their poor human rights records (Leftwich, 2000). Singapore, 
Malaysia and China, for example, have all been heavily criticised by human rights 
observers for withholding civil and political liberties from their citizens (Kim, n.d.: 3). 
However, irrespective of the poor human rights track records and the mishandling of 
certain individuals and organisations, Developmental States have been able to garner 
widespread support and legitimacy (Leftwich, 2000: 165). Legitimacy of the 
Developmental State is founded on the ability of the state to distribute the benefits of 
rapid economic development among the developmental elite and citizens alike 
(Leftwich, 2000: 165).   
 
Furthermore, Leftwich argues that the ability of a country to achieve socio-economic 
development is not determined by its regime type but rather by the nature of the state 
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and its domestic politics (Leftwich, 1993: 614). It is for this reason that it is difficult to 
replicate the experiences of a successful Developmental State (Leftwich, 2000: 168). 
Furthermore, the particular political factors which shape the nature of the 
Developmental State also give rise to two categories of Developmental States: Non-
Democratic and Democratic Developmental States (Leftwich, 2000: 168).  
 
2.2. The Democratic Developmental State 
The concept of the Democratic Developmental State is founded on the premise that 
not only is democracy consistent with development but that these two terms are 
complementary (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). The relationship between democracy 
and development has received significant attention and has been heavily debated 
throughout the latter part of the 20th century (Comparative Research Programme on 
Poverty [CROP]: 2014). However, before delving into the relationship between 
democracy and development, the conceptual and theoretical framework will first define 
these two concepts.  
 
2.2.1. Defining Democracy and Development 
The current conventional definition of democracy is defined as a set of established 
institutional procedures, which make provision for basic civil and political rights; regular 
free and fair elections and allows for inter-party competition (White, 1998: 19 – 20). 
Democracy in this form is also commonly referred to as a ‘formal/procedural 
democracy’ (EISA, 2008). However, this thesis will instead adopt the definition of 
substantive democracy which places emphasis on the promotion of equity, impartiality 
and inclusion of all people within the political process (Mair, 2011: 88). In this manner, 
substantive democracy emphasises the need for citizens to assume a more active and 
direct role in the formulation and execution of public policy (Robinson and White, 1998: 
3). Substantive democracy is defined as particular, “institutional arrangements for 
arriving at political decisions which realises the common good by making the people 
itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to 
carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 1947: 250). Substantive democracy promotes popular 
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participation through the establishment of institutional participatory mechanisms and 
channels throughout all levels of government (Houston and Liebenberg, 2001: 3).  
 
A narrow definition of development more generally associates it with economic growth 
and material wealth and is defined as, “a process of economic change involving the 
construction of more complex and productive economies capable of generating higher 
material standards of living” (White, 1998: 20; Robinson and White, 1998: 3). However, 
in line with Robinson and White, this thesis also conceives and defines development 
as being “more redistributive and inclusive” than other narrowly defined definitions and 
argues that the pursuit of development requires that states not only play a passive, 
regulatory, but also a more active and interventionist role in bringing about 
development (Robinson and White, 1998: 5; White, 1998: 20).  
 
In order for development to be “redistributive and inclusive”, it should be accompanied 
by the promotion of the following social objectives: the reduction and mitigation of 
relative and absolute poverty; the reversal of stark social inequalities; the provision of 
individual safety and security; and addressing impending threats such as 
environmental degradation (White, 1998: 20). Because all of the above social 
objectives can be identified as public goods, state involvement is needed in making 
the necessary provision for them (White, 1998: 20). In this regard, White notes that 
democratic countries which are able to meet the above social objectives can be 
labeled as being, “developmentally successful” (White, 1998: 20).  
 
2.2.2. The Democracy-Development Nexus 
The dominant world view held from the 1960s to the 1980s maintained that democracy 
and development were inconsistent and that poor societies in Third World countries 
could only develop under the guidance of authoritarian governments (Robinson and 
White, 1998: 1). The authoritarian nature of the state was viewed as the key ingredient 
to achieving economic growth and was informed in part by the developmental success 
achieved by newly industrialised authoritarian regimes in Latin America and East Asia 
(Robinson and White, 1998: 1). Under this view, the concept of democracy was 
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regarded as a grandiose plan afforded only to countries which were already 
developmentally successful. Such countries had already achieved a certain degree of 
sustained economic growth and had substantially increased the standards of living in 
their society (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). According to this view, democracy was 
seen as a challenge to underdeveloped countries in achieving sustained development 
as democratic politics produced demands which surpassed the ability and capacity of 
existing political institutions to adequately address (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). 
 
However, this perspective was challenged and lost its position as the dominant world 
viewpoint towards the end of the 1980s following three developments: Firstly, the 
emergence of a number of democracies (Botswana, Malaysia and Mauritius) who had 
achieved a high degree of developmental success proved that democracy and 
development are reconcilable concepts (Robinson and White, 1998: 1). Secondly, a 
vast number of authoritarian regimes in Africa (such as Cameroon and Togo) and Latin 
America (such as Argentina and Chile) failed to bring about development in their 
respective societies (Robinson and White, 1998: 1; Brown, 2001: 725; Smith, 1989; 
Pepinsky, 2009). Thirdly, following the ‘Third Wave’ of democratisation occurring 
during the 1970s and towards the end of the Cold War in 1989 (which resulted in the 
fall of communism), liberal democracy ascended as the dominant form of government 
(Robinson and White, 1998: 2). As a result of the above three developments, by the 
late end of the 1990s, authoritarianism was no longer viewed as a viable form of 
government for many developing countries (Robinson and White, 1998: 2).  
 
Therefore, for White, the concepts of democracy and development are interconnected 
(Kieh, 2015: 3; White, 1998). According to White, “democracy, even in its procedural 
or minimalist form, is a massive developmental good in its own right” (White, 2006: 
63). Democratic institutions, White argues, have the potential to tackle developmental 
challenges by allowing the state to play more of an active role in economic growth, 
redistribution of wealth and investing in social capital and physical infrastructure 
needed to facilitate and sustain economic growth and development (Kieh, 2015: 3; 
White, 1998). Ultimately, the task is to build a state which is regarded as both 
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democratic and developmental since the concepts of development and democracy are 
mutually reinforcing (Tostensen, 2008: 15).   
 
2.2.3. Definition of the Democratic Developmental State 
The concept of the Democratic Developmental State was initially introduced to 
incorporate elements of democracy into the original Developmental State model 
(Robinson and White, 1998: 5). Democratic Developmental States differ substantially 
from Classical Developmental States in that although certain countries in East Asia 
were regarded as developmentally successful, they were also inherently autocratic 
(Akokpari, 2012). Therefore, unlike the Classical Developmental States of East Asia, 
Democratic Developmental States are grounded in principles of democratic 
governance (Edigheji, 2010: vii). While Classical Developmental States mainly pursue 
economic development, Democratic Developmental States promote “holistic 
development” by pursuing both economic and democratic development (Akokpari, 
2012).   
 
The pursuit of economic and democratic development on the part of the Democratic 
Developmental State should first and foremost address the needs of the impoverished 
and marginalised groups of society (Robinson and White, 1998: 6). In this manner, a 
Democratic Developmental State is defined as one which aims to not only pursue rapid 
economic growth, but one which also seeks to uplift its citizens out of poverty through 
the formulation and implementation of pro-poor policies (Robinson and White, 1998: 
6). Therefore, the introduction of the Democratic Developmental State signals a sharp 
departure from traditional notions of the Developmental State in which the state 
remained oppressive and unresponsive to its citizenry, in spite of its claims of reducing 
poverty and increasing living standards (Robinson and White, 1998: 6).    
 
Khabele Matlosa defines the Democratic Developmental State as being, “marked by 
mutually reinforcing state-society relations on one hand and the complementarity of 
state interventionism and market forces on the other” (Matlosa, 2005: 4). In this regard, 
a Democratic Developmental State functions in such a manner as to allow for the 
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active participation and involvement of non-state actors within the developmental 
agenda-setting phase and democratisation process (Matlosa, 2005: 2). However, 
state-society relations in Democratic Developmental States differ from that found in 
Classical Developmental States in that they are not restricted to government-private 
sector alliances (Edigheji, 2005). Therefore, within the context of the Democratic 
Developmental State, the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ associated with the 
Classical Developmental State is widened to accommodate not only the interests and 
views of the private sector, but also that of other key social actors (Edigheji, 2005; 
Green, 2011/12: 41).  
 
White refers to this concept as ‘inclusive embeddedness’ and argues that it is the 
ability of the Democratic Developmental State to promote and establish horizontal 
relationships between the state and society, elected officials and the electorate and 
political parties and its supporters (Edigheji, 2005). In this manner, a Democratic 
Developmental State is also defined as, “one that forges broad-based alliances with 
society and ensures popular participation in the governance and transformation 
processes” (Edigheji, 2005). Therefore, in order for a Developmental State to be 
regarded as truly democratic it ought to incorporate the values, interests and 
aspirations of the majority of its citizens within its developmental policies (Robinson 
and White, 1998: 6).  
 
According to Richard Sandbrook, the concept of the Democratic Developmental State 
is viewed as superior to that of the Developmental State in at least three ways: Firstly, 
democracy encourages leaders to pursue developmental strategies in order to 
improve growth and equity (Sandbrook, 2005: 552). Furthermore, the accomplishment 
thereof will assist in strengthening democratic institutions (Sandbrook, 2005: 552). 
Secondly, by holding leaders accountable, democratic politics strengthens the 
government’s capacity to garner legitimacy and improve administrative efficiency 
(Sandbrook, 2005: 552). Thirdly, the presence of democratic institutions allows for 
bureaucratic and political elite to act independently of the interests of the private 
sector, thereby making them better able to pursue equitable socio-economic 
development (Sandbrook, 2005: 552). However, Sandbrook further notes that 
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Democratic Developmental States are a rarity precisely because the prerequisites 

























Chapter Three: Benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State – A Review 
of the Literature  
3.1. Richard Sklar and ‘Developmental Democracy’ 
Various authors who have contributed to the growing debate on the Democratic 
Developmental State have been influenced by Sklar’s concept and theory of 
‘developmental democracy’. The concept of ‘developmental democracy’ was first 
coined by C. B. Macpherson to describe a new liberal democratic model which 
developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which shifted emphasis away 
from private property rights to “‘individual self-development’ as an universal right” 
(Macpherson, 1977: 44 – 76; Held, 1996: 75; Levine, 1992: 342; Sklar, 1996: 35). In 
1982, Sklar used the term ‘developmental democracy’ to denote an “ends-means 
relationship” in which democracy is regarded as the means to which national 
development is achieved (Sklar, 1996: 25; Sklar, 1996: 40).  
 
Sklar’s theory of developmental democracy seeks to outline the usefulness of 
democracy as a means of national development (Sklar, 1996: 26). In his theory, Sklar 
highlights the deepening of democracy as an important prerequisite for the emergence 
a Democratic Developmental State (Sklar, 1996; Omoweh, 2012: 10). Furthermore, 
his theory asserts that small, gradual moves made towards democracy by nation-
states will most likely generate positive developmental spinoffs (Sklar, 1996: 28). In so 
doing, Sklar argues that no one government can be exclusively classified as wholly 
democratic: each system of government is a combination of “democracy (power of the 
people) and oligarchy (rule of the few)” (Sklar, 1996: 27). According to Sklar, whole-
system classifications of governments are inaccurate (Sklar, 1996: 37 & 40). For Sklar, 
partial elements of the democratic model gradually emerge in different variations in 
different countries, with each element motivating the acquisition of another, with the 
realisation of the Democratic Developmental State being regarded as the end goal 
(Sklar, 1996; Omoweh, 2012: 10).  
 
Sklar’s conception of democracy has been encapsulated in the phrase ‘democracy in 
parts’ and was used in the 1980s by Sklar to describe authoritarian and military 
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regimes which exhibited important democratic features (Sklar, 1983; Luckham and 
Hutchful, 2010: 51). Similarly, the phrase, ‘democracy in parts’ has also been used to 
refer to formal democracies who are constrained by serious democratic deficits (Sklar, 
1983; Luckham and Hutchful, 2010: 51). In this regard, Sklar asserts that “fragments” 
of democracy become integrated into social, economic and state institutions over a 
period of time (Sklar, 1996: 40). These democratic elements include provision of 
welfare services, judicial independence, equal application of the law, as well as 
features of electoral democracy (such as freedom of speech and association) and 
industrial democracy (such as the establishment of trade unions) (Sklar, 1996: 40).  
 
Therefore, Sklar proposes an incremental approach to the construction of a 
Democratic Developmental State (Sklar, 1996; Omoweh, 2012: 10). Such an approach 
requires a considerable degree of ingenuity on the part of bureaucrats and politicians 
in the development of key democratic institutions geared at tackling developmental 
challenges (Sklar, 1987: 714; White, 2006: 63). Consequently, the present-day 
developmental democrat is viewed by Sklar as a “modern Machiavelli” who attempts 
to bring together the two seemingly inconsistent terms of democracy and development 
through deliberate and gradual institutional alterations (White, 2006: 65; Sklar, 1996).  
 
3.2. Adrian Leftwich and ‘The Primacy of Politics’ 
Similarly to Leftwich’s work on the Classical Developmental State, his further 
contributions to the Democratic Developmental State also focuses on the role of 
politics in the emergence and success of such states. For Leftwich, institutional design 
alone cannot bring about a Democratic Developmental State in a particular country – 
what is further needed is the correct mix of democratic politics to support and sustain 
the Democratic Developmental State model (Leftwich, 1998: 55). While Leftwich refers 
to Democratic Developmental States as ‘developmental democracies’, for clarity and 
continuity sake, this chapter will use the term Democratic Developmental States.  
 
3.2.1 Democratic Developmental States 
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According to Leftwich, six key features make up a Developmental State model (as 
outlined in the previous chapter) and is shared by both Democratic and Non-
Democratic States (Leftwich, 1996: 290). In addition to these six features, Democratic 
Developmental States must meet two preconditions if they are to be regarded as 
equally democratic and developmental (Leftwich, 1998: 55). Firstly, Leftwich argues 
that such states must achieve a four per cent annual increase in its Gross National 
Profit (GNP) for a period of 25 to 35 years (Leftwich, 1998: 55). Secondly, what 
differentiates Democratic from Non-Democratic Developmental States is the presence 
of democracy (Leftwich, 1996: 290). Here, Leftwich uses a minimalist Schumpeterian 
definition of democracy (Leftwich, 1998: 55). Therefore, to qualify as a democracy, 
Leftwich argues that such states must hold regular, free and fair elections; encourage 
political participation; uphold civil and political rights; and allow for peaceful succession 
in the event of regime change (Leftwich, 1998: 55).   
 
For Leftwich, Democratic Developmental States are difficult to construct and maintain 
because they must satisfy the two seemingly contradictory criteria of democracy and 
development (Leftwich, 1998: 56). Concerning democracy, on the one hand, Leftwich 
argues that democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the construction 
of a Democratic Developmental State (Leftwich, 1998: 55). A Democratic 
Developmental State is viewed as incomplete without the consolidation of democracy. 
Unstable and unconsolidated democracies have the potential to hinder and constrain 
the developmental capacity of the state (Leftwich, 1998: 57). Leftwich defines 
democratic consolidation as occurring firstly, when political parties place a higher 
premium on democratic institutions and processes than on outcomes. Secondly, when 
the probability of an opposing party replacing the ruling party through elections is high 
(Leftwich, 1998: 58; Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela, 1992: 3; Welsh, 2004: 
14).  Democratic consolidation, therefore, presupposes governmental renewal through 
elections (Welsh, 2004: 14).  
  
However, the political conditions essential for democratic consolidation simultaneously 
limits the state’s capacity and its ability to pursue developmental strategies 
autonomously (Leftwich, 1998: 77). This is due to the political conditions for 
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democratic consolidation that dictates policy-makers practice restraint in policy-
making and acknowledge and accept the constitutional restraints placed on their 
newly-found authority and power (Leftwich, 1998: 59). Therefore, when formulating 
policy, policy-makers must opt for small, gradual shifts in policy (Leftwich, 1998: 56).  
 
On the other hand, for a country to be developmentally successful, policy-makers need 
to be given discretion in policy-making: This is primarily due to the changing nature of 
policy-making in Developmental States which tends to be characterised by drastic 
changes in policy that fundamentally transforms the economic and social structure 
within a society (Leftwich, 1998: 56). Ultimately, the emergence of successful 
Democratic Developmental States depends on the state’s ability to effectively 
reconcile the conservative prerequisites of democratic consolidation within the radical 
logic that necessitates rapid economic growth and development (Leftwich, 1998: 56 – 
57).  
 
3.2.2. Classification of Democratic Developmental States 
According to Leftwich, each democratic state exhibits various configurations of 
democratic politics which determine not only the type of democracy but also the 
developmental capacity and trajectory of the particular democratic state (Leftwich, 
1998: 55). In this respect, Leftwich distinguishes between two forms of Democratic 
Developmental States: Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States and 
Coalitional Democratic Developmental States (Leftwich, 1998: 63).  
 
 Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States 
The Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental State ascribes most closely to the 
Classical Developmental State in that power and authority is centralised within a 
relatively unchallenged hegemonic party (Leftwich, 1998: 64). Out of the two 
categories, the Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental State exhibits a greater 
developmental capacity (Leftwich, 1998: 63). This is primarily because dominant-party 
democracies are able to exude the required, “power, authority, autonomy, continuity 
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and political capacity” needed by Developmental States to accomplish and maintain 
rapid economic growth and development (Leftwich, 1996: 290).  
 
Therefore, in the same manner in which authoritarian regimes have been able to guide 
growth and development in Classical Developmental States, so too do dominant-
parties direct and shape the developmental trajectory in the Democratic 
Developmental State (Leftwich, 1996: 291). Examples of Dominant-Party Democratic 
Developmental States provided by Leftwich include Botswana and Singapore 
(Leftwich, 1998: 63). Furthermore, Leftwich notes that the formal requirements of 
democratic politics have not in any way worked against the developmental capacity 
within a Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental State but have helped to 
strengthen and produce a considerable measure of legitimacy (Leftwich, 1998: 67). 
Ultimately, the success of Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States has 
been its ability to reconcile the conditions of democracy with that of economic growth 
by giving preference to economic growth (Leftwich, 1998: 68).      
 
 Coalitional Democratic Developmental States 
Coalitional democratic states arise typically during a political or economic crisis when 
a number of political parties demonstrate that they can play an important role in 
resolving such a crisis (Leftwich, 1998: 67). These parties are inclined to formulate 
new rules governing domestic politics and work towards reaching an agreement 
concerning development policy (Leftwich, 1998: 67). Leftwich cites Mauritius and 
Malaysia as key examples of Coalitional Democratic Developmental States (Leftwich, 
1998: 63).  
 
Unlike Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental States, the developmental 
autonomy and capacity within a Coalitional Democratic Developmental State is 
substantially less (Leftwich, 1998: 66). In order to build any developmental capacity 
within a Coalitional Democratic Developmental State, a consensus needs to be 
reached among all the key political parties concerning the developmental trajectory of 
the state (Leftwich, 1998: 66). Consequently, Coalitional Democratic Developmental 
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States manage to reconcile the conditions of consolidated democracy with that of 
economic growth through consensus and co-operation by favouring the former 
(Leftwich, 1998: 69). In this manner, agreed upon developmental strategies will persist 
regardless of any changes in the political coalition (Leftwich, 1998: 66). Although state 
autonomy is more restrained in this instance than in a dominant-party model, 
Coalitional Democratic Developmental States benefit more from creating a stable, 
consolidated democracy which may prove more lasting than a dominant-party model 
(Leftwich, 1998: 70).  
 
3.2.3. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, Leftwich notes that Democratic Developmental States which have been 
most effective at achieving economic growth and development have been those states 
whose autonomy has not been limited by political factors (Leftwich, 1998: 78). 
Consequently, Leftwich refers to Democratic Developmental States as “authoritarian 
democracies” or “low intensity democracies”, precisely because their political 
characteristics locate them between a democratic and authoritarian system of 
government (Leftwich, 1996: 290; Leftwich, 1998: 78). Such states are described as 
having low rates of popular sovereignty and participation, as well as poor human rights 
records (Leftwich, 1998: 78).  
 
Leftwich therefore asserts that developmentally successful democracies are 
democracies which have focused more on satisfying the conditions prevalent for 
democratic consolidation than on public participation and greater political equality 
(Leftwich, 1998: 78). Such democracies may not meet all the requirements of liberal 
or social democracy but are more desirable than autocracies (Leftwich, 1996: 292). 
By distinguishing between the two forms of Democratic Developmental States, 
Leftwich shows that it is not simply the case of whether democracy is needed for 
development or even if development is consistent with democracy that matters when 
deliberating Democratic Developmental States, but rather the particular configuration 




3.3. Gordon White and Mark Robinson and ‘The Political and Institutional Design 
of a Democratic Developmental State’ 
In The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design White and 
Robinson argue that particular political conditions and democratic institutions are two 
essential ingredients required to build successful Democratic Developmental States. 
Taken together, White and Robinson argues that both have the ability to deepen 
democracy and achieve “productive and equitable” developmental results (Robinson 
and White, 1998: 5). White and Robinson note that while particular political conditions 
cannot be spontaneously engineered, state and non-state actors can intervene by 
designing and creating democratic institutions which could have the potential to 
influence a state-led development trajectory and policy environment (Robinson and 
White, 1998: 5).  
 
White and Robinson’s central thesis is informed primarily by issues concerning the 
relationship between democratic consolidation and developmental efficacy which 
emerges in the long-term. In this manner, White and Robinson note that the ability of 
newly democratic regimes in poor countries to sustain and consolidate democracy 
depends largely on their capacity to direct and sustain socio-economic development 
(White, 1998: 28). Ultimately, insufficient progress in socio-economic development 
undermines democracy by marginalising impoverished groups from the political 
process. Denying impoverished and marginalised groups access to political processes 
will then in turn produce a discontented society which may erupt in political violence 
(White, 1998: 28). Furthermore, over time, democratic regimes will face increasing 
difficulty in reconciling society-wide welfare demands against coherent economic 
principles for growth (White, 1998: 29).     
 
However, White and Robinson argue that there exists a “virtuous spiral” between 
socioeconomic development and political development which can only come about 
through conscious institutional alterations of the state apparatus (White and Robinson, 
1998). In this regard, they argue that the concepts of democracy and development can 
be reconciled and made compatible in the long-run through constructing an effective 
Democratic Developmental State (Robinson and White, 1998: 5). According to White, 
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any moves made towards democratisation will be futile if they are not accompanied by 
initiatives to reform and strengthen the state apparatus (White, 2006: 34). In other 
words, any hopes of achieving developmental success on the part of democratic 
regimes relies to a greater extent on the ability of the state to construct and maintain 
an effective Democratic Developmental State (White, 1998: 20). 
 
3.3.1. Key Features of a Democratic Developmental State 
According to White, Democratic Developmental States are characterised by the 
following five key features: consensual autonomy, social embeddedness, inclusive 
embeddedness, institutional coherence and authoritative penetration (White, 1998: 30 
– 31).  White’s model of a Democratic Developmental State retains two of the main 
features of the Developmental State model, namely, that of ‘autonomy’ and ‘social 
embeddedness’ (otherwise referred to by Evans as ‘embedded autonomy’). As stated 
earlier in Chapter Two, literature on the Classical Developmental State has highlighted 
the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ as an essential feature of the Developmental 
State model. However, as also noted in the  Chapter Two, the concept of ‘embedded 
autonomy’ as displayed in East Asian autocratic states will be less transferable to 
democratic regimes which are “more porous” and responsive to societal pressures 
(White, 1998: 30). Therefore, White has broadened the concepts of ‘autonomy’ and 
‘embeddedness’ in order to make it more applicable within a democratic context. In so 
doing, White’s Democratic Developmental State model promotes a more inclusive 
approach to the formulation and implementation of developmental policy (White, 1998; 
Edigheji, 2005: 14).  
 
In this regard, White introduces the concept of ‘consensual autonomy’ and ‘inclusive 
embeddedness’: ‘Consensual autonomy’ refers firstly to the ability of political leaders 
(who are held accountable by state institutions) to pursue policies geared towards 
socio-economic development (White, 1998: 30). Secondly, it also refers to the 
discretion given to administrative agencies to implement these policies under the 
guidance of political officials (White, 1998: 30). In this manner, consensual autonomy 
refers to the ability of democratic institutions to increase the autonomy of political and 
bureaucratic elites in relation to private sector interests in their pursuit of 
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developmental goals (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller and Teichman, 2007: 24). By 
holding political and bureaucratic elite institutionally accountable, the Democratic 
Developmental State is further able to garner legitimacy and popular support for its 
developmental policies (Sandbrook et al., 2007: 24).     
 
In order for consensual autonomy to operate fairly within a Democratic Developmental 
State, White argues that political and bureaucratic elites need to be “inclusively 
embedded” within the society (White, 1998: 31; Sandbrook et al., 2007: 24). ‘Inclusive 
embeddedness” refers to the forging of relationships and alliances with broader 
sections of society and therefore not limiting alliances to the private sector solely 
(White, 1998: 31). In this manner, Democratic Developmental States can better ensure 
equitable development because political elites are held accountable by a wider section 
of society who are also included in the developmental process (White, 1998: 31).  
 
The ability of a Democratic Developmental State to act autonomously in any capacity 
depends on the level of its ‘institutional coherence’ (White, 1998: 30). A high degree 
of institutional coherence is required in the allocation and exercise of power throughout 
various parts of the bureaucracy (White, 1998: 30). In addition, White asserts that 
Democratic Developmental States should be grounded in ‘authoritative penetration’ 
(White, 1998: 30). ‘Authoritative penetration’ refers to the ability of the bureaucracy to 
guide the economy by enforcing economic regulations (White, 1998: 30). Such 
regulations seek to penetrate society with the aim of expropriating resources for the 
implementation of developmental policies (Bernstein and Lü, 2003: 5). Examples of 
these include: designing and enforcing sophisticated systems of economic regulation 
or broadening of the tax revenue base (White, 1998: 31).   
 
3.3.2. Concluding Remarks 
In concluding, White notes that Democratic Developmental States are not common 
precisely because of the manner in which they have been defined (White, 1998: 44). 
Democratic Developmental States which White envisages have been defined in 
conflicting terms which are difficult to reconcile in reality (White, 1998: 44). As 
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discussed in this chapter, White’s conception of a Democratic Developmental State 
encompasses contradictory elements of “autonomy and accountability; growth and 
redistribution; [and] consensus and inclusiveness” (White, 1998: 44). For this reason, 
White notes that the construction of a Democratic Developmental State will most likely 
involve a process of repeated, varied attempts (White, 1998: 46). Depending on the 
country’s ability to achieve these contradictory elements, White argues that the 
particular form in which the Democratic Developmental State will emerge will differ 
from country to country (White, 1998: 46).  
 
3.4. Omano Edigheji and a Democratic Developmental State Model for Africa 
Edigheji is primarily concerned with crafting a model of the Democratic Developmental 
State that may be made applicable to the African context (Edigheji, 2005: 1). According 
to Edigheji, the majority of post-independent African States suffer from severe 
democratic and developmental issues (Edigheji, 2005: 1). On the economic front, 
African states have been characterised by: an overreliance on its extractive industries, 
high rates of unemployment, an overreliance on foreign aid, high levels of foreign debt, 
decreasing levels of foreign direct investment and low domestic capital accumulation 
(Edigheji, 2005: 1). On the political front, most African states have been plagued by 
dictatorships, unstable political regimes and intrastate conflict (Edigheji, 2005: 1). 
Therefore, Edigheji advocates for the adoption of the Democratic Developmental State 
model by African leaders which he believes is the most suitable response to the issue 
of Africa’s weak economies and democratic concerns.  
 
In defining and constructing a model of a Democratic Developmental State, Edigheji 
assessed the particular institutional characteristics and key objectives of such states. 
Key to Edigheji’s assessment is the examination of two important dimensions which 
make up Democratic Developmental States: the democratic and the developmental 
dimension (Kieh, 2015: 3; Edigheji, 2005). Firstly, the democratic dimension should 
exhibit the basic features of procedural democracy whereby political leaders are 
elected through regular, free and fair elections in which individuals are allowed to run 
for political office and where universal suffrage is provided for (Edigheji, 2005: 18; 




In addition to the basic features of procedural democracy, Democratic Developmental 
States should encourage the involvement of citizens within areas of governance and 
development (Edigheji, 2005: 5). For Edigheji, an African Democratic Developmental 
State is primarily concerned with bringing, “citizenship back into politics” (Edigheji, 
2005: 5). Such a state should seek to unite people, irrespective of their social, political, 
religious or ethnic divisions, around a “common good” (Edigheji, 2005: 5). In this 
manner, Edigheji’s conception of the African Democratic Developmental State seeks 
to find ways in which ‘participatory democracy’ can supplement procedural democracy 
(Edigheji, 2005: 5). 
 
Secondly, regarding the developmental dimension, Edigheji argues that a Democratic 
Developmental State should have the necessary capacity to pursue development and 
economic growth (Edigheji, 2005: 18). This requires that the state transforms its 
economic base by pursuing economic activities which are highly profitable (Edigheji, 
2005: 5 – 6). Furthermore, Edigheji stipulates that the economic growth experienced 
by the Democratic Developmental State needs to produce improved living standards 
for the majority of its citizens (Edigheji, 2005: 6). As stated by White in the previous 
chapter, Edigheji also notes that Democratic Developmental States pursue a number 
of socio-economic objectives such as the eradication of poverty and social inequalities, 
ensuring individual safety and addressing the deterioration of the environment 
(Edigheji, 2005: 6).     
 
In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the Democratic Developmental 
State needs to exhibit particular institutional features (Edigheji, 2005: 7). While the 
institutional characteristics of the Democratic Developmental State are similar to that 
of the Developmental State in that they facilitate the state in pursuing and obtaining 
economic growth, they differ in that they are also tailored to pursue its socio-economic 
objectives (Edigheji, 2005: 6). In this regard, Edigheji draws on the work of White and 
argues that Democratic Developmental States should exhibit the institutional features 
of autonomy, social embeddedness, inclusive embeddedness and institutional 
coherence (Edigheji, 2005: 10). In conclusion, Edigheji notes that although particular 
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institutional arrangements may differ from one Democratic Developmental State to 
another, the underlying logic and purpose of these institutional arrangements remains 
the same; which is to ensure inclusivity and broad participation within the democratic 
process as well as decisive governance, accountable leadership and political stability 
(Edigheji, 2005: 13).  
 
3.5. Five Benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State 
Having surveyed the contributions made by five key authors on the topic of the 
Democratic Developmental State, this chapter will now outline five important 
benchmarks which will be used to assess Botswana and South Africa within the 
Democratic Developmental State framework. As noted by Leftwich, White, Robinson 
and Edigheji, Democratic Developmental States will most likely retain some of the 
features of the original Developmental State model, however these features will be 
adjusted slightly to fit the context of a democratic state. For this reason, the first 
benchmark that this chapter has arrived at is the presence of Development-Oriented 
Political Leadership. As stated in the previous chapter, this refers to the determined 
and incorrupt developmental elite who are dedicated to economic growth and 
transformation and who possess the capacity to realise this vision (Leftwich, 2000: 
160).  
 
The presence of an Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy will be used 
as the second benchmark. This chapter has chosen to focus on this part of the 
bureaucracy primarily because it is most responsible for economic coordination and 
development (Leftwich, 1995: 411). Effective and Well-Insulated Economic 
Bureaucracies are those that: Firstly, have a pilot agency that exercises immense 
power and authority needed to coordinate the activities of individual economic 
agencies as to ensure a high degree of internal bureaucratic cohesion and 
centralisation (Johnson, 1982: 26; Kim, 2009a: 8). Secondly, protects 
technocrats/economic planners within the economic bureaucracy from external 
influences in such a way as to prevent political pressures from having an excessive 
bearing on or potentially overturning the developmental project (Edigheji, 2010: 7). 
Thirdly, forms broad alliances with the private sector as to achieve a high level of 
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embedded autonomy, or, as White puts it, social embeddedness. In this manner, the 
Economic Bureaucracy forms close ties with industrialists and the business sector 
which will aid it in the formulation and implementation of developmental policies. 
Lastly, appoints the most technically competent and highly trained individuals, recruits 
and promotes them on the basis of merit and compensates according to similar rates 
found in the private sector (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Court, Kristen and Weder, 1999: 
3).  
 
In order for the Economic Bureaucracy to operate optimally it will need to cultivate a 
considerable degree of what White termed institutional coherence. Furthermore, state 
agencies within the Economic Bureaucracy need to ground in what White referred to 
as authoritative penetration if they are to effectively pursue the needed developmental 
policies. However, in order to make these two features more reflective of the realities 
of the Democratic Developmental State, this thesis will draw on White in arguing that 
both the Development-Oriented Political Leadership and the Economic Bureaucracy 
operate with a considerable degree of consensual autonomy. In this regard, while the 
political leadership acts with autonomy in their pursuit of socio-economic development, 
they are held “institutionally accountable” (White, 1998: 30). Likewise, while the 
administrative agencies of the Economic Bureaucracy are given much discretion in the 
formulation and implementation of developmental policies, they are still held 
accountable by the elected officials.    
 
Thirdly, in order to qualify as a Developmental State (democratic or otherwise) the 
particular state needs to have achieved a degree of Developmental Success. As noted 
above by Leftwich, White and Edigheji, this refers to the ability of the state to achieve 
high growth rates, redistribute wealth and improve the overall standard of living for the 
majority of the population. In this regard, economic growth will be measured using the 
annual percentage growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Broadly speaking, GDP 
refers to, “the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products” 
(World Bank, 2015a). This chapter has chosen to measure economic growth in terms 
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of GDP because it is the most common indicator used by economists when assessing, 
the strength of domestic and international economies (Callen, 2012).  
 
However, because the GDP of a country does not reveal the general well-being of the 
population, this thesis will use the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to assess the overall standard of living of 
the population (Callen, 2012). In this regard, the HDI assesses improvement in human 
development by bringing together indicators such as per capita income, life 
expectancy and educational fulfillment and rating countries between 1 (best) and 160 
(worst) (Leftwich, 1996: 289). In addition, the HDI also scores countries between 1 
and 0: Countries that are awarded a score less than 0.5 are regarded as having a low 
level of human development, those rated between 0.5 and 0.79 are regarded as 
achieving an average level of human development and countries awarded a value of 
or exceeding 0.8 are viewed as having attained exceptional standards of human 
development (Prinsloo, 2014). Furthermore, the country’s ability to redistribute wealth 
will be measured using the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is the most common 
indicator used to assess inequality within a country and rates countries between 0 and 
1 where 0 signifies “complete equality” and 1 represents “complete inequality” 
(Statistics South Africa, 2014: 35).  
 
As noted above by Sklar and Leftwich, the presence of a consolidated democracy is 
a key characteristic which sets Democratic Developmental States apart from Non-
Democratic ones. For this reason, the presence of a Consolidated Electoral 
Democracy will be used as the fourth benchmark. As argued above by Leftwich and 
Edigheji, a Democratic Developmental State should exhibit the basic features of 
democracy such as regular, free and fair elections; political participation; civil and 
political rights; and peaceful succession in the event of regime change.  
 
While exhibiting the basic features of procedural elements of democracy, as argued 
by White and Edigheji, a Democratic Developmental State should also include 
elements of participatory democracy. For this reason, Popular Participation in the 
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Development and Governance Process is flagged as the fifth and final benchmark. 
This benchmark will specifically assess the extent to which the two countries under 
review have effectively been able to establish mechanisms which facilitate the 
inclusion of citizens within the development and governance process. In this manner, 
participatory mechanisms established should be made accessible to the entire 
population (especially marginalised and minority groups) (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 
101). By incorporating broad segments of the population within the development and 
governance process, the state will be most likely to achieve what White referred to as 

























Chapter Four: Botswana, an African Democratic Developmental State? 
4.1. Critical Analysis of the Botswanan Democratic Developmental State 
4.1.1. Development-Oriented Political Leadership 
Political leadership of Botswana’s presidents and political elite has been widely 
regarded as one of the main reasons for its positive transformation and developmental 
success (Meyns, 2010: 46). Since independence in 1966, Botswana’s political leaders 
have managed to play a significant role in defining its developmental trajectory 
(Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 29). Botswana’s political elites have done so by 
pursuing various policies geared at economic growth and development (Tsie, 1996: 
601). For this reason political elites in Botswana are said to have, “acquired a 
developmental orientation” (Tsie, 1996: 601). According to Penelope Hartland-
Thunberg, Botswana is viewed as a prime example of how an underdeveloped country 
can drastically improve its socio-economic situation under the guidance of a committed 
and determined political leadership (Hartland-Thunberg, 1978: 79).  
 
Key political leaders in this regard have been Seretse Khama (the first President 1965 
– 80), Quett Masire (Vice President 1965 – 80 and second President 1980 – 98), 
Festus Mogae (third President 1998 – 2008) and Ian Khama (Vice President 1980 – 
2008 and also the current President since 2008) (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 
29). Under the guidance of strong leadership (particularly that of the founding leaders, 
Seretse Khama and Quett Masire), Botswana was able to adopt a “two-pronged 
strategy of democratization and economic development” which has ultimately resulted 
its economic and democratic success (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 33).     
 
Under the leadership of Seretse Khama, the government curbed all forms of corruption 
(Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 37). In this regard, Botswana’s founding leaders 
of Botswana went to great lengths to stamp out wastefulness and corruption in public 
office (Sebudubudu, and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 37). Furthermore, because they were 
already wealthy by the time they entered public office (having owned vast amounts of 
cattle), political leaders used public office as a means of gaining support and not 
wealth (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 37). Ultimately, the goal of political 
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leaders in Botswana was not the pursuit of self-enrichment, but rather the elevation of 
their people and the country out of poverty (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2011: 37; 
Tsie, 1998). 
 
The Constitution of Botswana confers a large amount of power in its presidency and 
hence, the president “acts with little review” (Bodilenyane, 2012: 188). In this manner, 
the Constitution of Botswana stipulates that all executive powers reside within the 
presidency (Sebudubudu, 2010: 8). Included in these powers is the power of the 
president to appoint and dismiss cabinet members, the Chief Justice and the President 
of the High Court of Appeal (Good, 2008: 28; Sebudubudu, 2010: 8; Republic of 
Botswana, 1966). Furthermore, the president also has the power to prolong, dissolve 
or recall parliament at any point (Good, 2008: 28; Sebudubudu, 2010: 8).  
 
It has been argued by opposition parties that the appointment of judges by the 
president has remained a largely closed and secretive process (Saleshando, 2012). 
In this regard, there have been concerns raised that the appointment of these judges 
in Botswana are not divorced from, but linked to the ruling party. Thus, the ability of 
the Botswanan judiciary to preside over matters impartially may be compromised 
(Saleshando, 2012). Furthermore, Dumelang Saleshando argues that Botswana can 
only truly be said to have judicial independence once the appointment of members in 
the justice system are not dominated by the executive within the ruling party 
(Saleshando, 2012). 
 
In addition to the powers bestowed on the presidency, John Holm notes that 
Botswana’s presidents have succeeded in holding the “dominant power position” 
because their political party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) repeatedly enjoys 
an overwhelming majority in parliament (Holm, 1996: 101). Consequently, Members 
of Parliament (MPs) are given no choice but to rubber stamp developmental policies 
crafted by the bureaucrats (Holm, 1996: 102). In this regard, most MPs lack the 
knowledge and expertise to effectively evaluate and (where necessary) criticise these 
policies (Holm, 1996: 102). The MPs also lack staff support which makes them 
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ineffective to the task (Holm, 1996: 102). However, where they do manage to contest 
a policy supported by the president and the permanent secretaries, they are met with 
strong pressure from the BDP MPs (Holm, 1996: 102).  
 
Botswana presidents manage to assume complete control of their cabinets because 
they are careful in their appointment of cabinet ministers (Holm, 1996: 101). Cabinet 
ministers appointed by the president are those who mainly come from a civil service 
background and do not have many political supporters (Holm, 1996: 101). Such 
cabinet minister appointees mainly serve to defend and support the positions taken by 
economic planners within the cabinet and parliament (Holm, 1996: 101). Furthermore, 
they also assist the president in coherently expressing and supporting the various 
economic plans outlined by the planners (Holm, 1996: 102).   
 
Consequently, due to the dominant position of Botswana’s ruling party and with the 
huge amount of power bestowed on it by the constitution, the president of Botswana 
is able to exert considerable influence over the executive, legislature and judiciary 
(Fakir, 2009: 6). In this manner, the president’s powers straddles all three branches of 
government and ultimately undermines the principle of the separation of powers 
designed check and balance out the presidential powers and hold the president 
accountable (Molomo, 2000, 97; Fakir, 2009: 6). As a result, because the president in 
Botswana is not held sufficiently accountable by state institutions, the Development-
Oriented Political Leadership within Botswana does not exhibit the first element of 
consensual autonomy, namely that of “institutionally accountable” political leadership.  
 
4.1.2. Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy 
An important factor in explaining the success of Botswana has been the establishment 
of an effective and well-insulated economic bureaucracy (Sebudubudu, 2010: 12). The 
demise of British colonialism within Botswana saw the emergence of a bureaucratic 
state in which powerful bureaucratic elites have been responsible for the formulation 




 Presence of a Pilot Agency 
A high degree of internal bureaucratic cohesion and centralisation within Botswana’s 
economic bureaucracy has been ensured through its pilot agency, the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). The MFDP has been referred to as the, 
“institutional nerve centre of the Botswana state”, and has been able to assume a 
strong leadership role in Botswana’s development (Sebudubudu, 2005: 83). This has 
largely been due to the necessary clout given to the MFDP by the executive to 
dominate other ministries: In this regard, planning units in other ministries are held 
directly accountable by the director of Economic Affairs within the MFDP (Thovoethin, 
2014: 263; Samatar, 1999: 85; Sebudubudu, 2005: 83).  
 
The MFDP is responsible for (among other tasks) the formulation and implementation 
of fiscal and economic policies, taxation policy, regulating non-bank financial 
institutions and formulating and coordinating the government’s budget (Raphaeli, 
Roumani and MacKellar, 1984: 18; Republic of Botswana, 2013: 30). As can be seen, 
the MFDP is a powerful pilot agency precisely because it combines planning, 
budgetary, regulatory and taxation powers within one institution, which has further 
enabled it to assume an “aggressive role in planning investment” and authoritatively 
penetrate both the Botswanan society and the economy (Holm, 1988: 187 – 197; 
Leftwich, 1995: 412). 
 
In this regard, one of the most important tasks assigned to the MFDP is the 
coordinating and steering of the government’s NDP (Sebudubudu, 2010: 12). The 
NDP is a strategic document containing and outlining all of Botswana’s development 
projects that are to be carried out in the medium term (usually over a period of six 
years) (Sebudubudu, 2010: 12; Republic of Botswana, 2014). Included as well in the 
NDP is the anticipated revenue and expenditure for the six-year period (Republic of 
Botswana, 2014). The NDP functions as a “blueprint for government policy” and is 
compiled by technocrats and approved by politicians (Taylor, 2005: 48). In this 
manner, the NDPs have an additional benefit of placing the necessary distance 
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between technocrats and politicians particularly in the implementation of 
developmental plans (Taylor, 2005: 48). Therefore, Botswana’s economic 
bureaucracy operates with White’s second component of consensual autonomy in that 
although the technocrats are given much discretion in the formulation of the NDPs, 
these plans need to be approved by elected officials prior to them being implemented. 
Therefore, the economic bureaucracy is held to account and operates under the 
supervision of the politicians.  
 
 Insulation of Economic Bureaucrats 
The ability of Botswana to effectively insulate and shield its economic bureaucracy 
from any societal and political pressures has also been central to its developmental 
success (Holm, 1996: 98). This has been made possible primarily because the MFDP 
has been traditionally housed in the office of the Vice President and led by the Vice 
President himself (Thovoethin, 2014: 263). Economic planners in Botswana are 
shielded from external pressures and given considerable leeway in the formulation 
and implementation of their plans because they have the backing of the executive 
(Holm, 1996: 100). 
 
 Social Embeddedness 
The relative and consensual autonomy of Botswana’s economic bureaucracy has 
been further “socially embedded” in a network which brings key businesses and cattle 
ranchers together with politicians and bureaucrats (Taylor, 2003: 23). Botswana’s 
ability to form state-society alliances characterised by social embeddedness has been 
cited as an additional factor which has led to its success (Mogalakwe, 2003: 87). The 
Botswana government has regarded the private sector and other social actors as 
important players in the country’s economic development and consults with them 
regularly through the High Level Consultative Conference (HLCC) and the National 
Business Conference (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). These conferences have 
subsequently informed many of Botswana’s developmental policies, which have been 
favourable not only to the private sector, but also to national development 




 Meritocratic Recruitment and Compensation of Economic Bureaucrats 
In order to ensure a high degree of efficiency within Botswana’s economic 
bureaucracy, only highly competent economic cadre are recruited (Wallis, 1989: 52). 
Botswana’s use of meritocratic recruitment as a means of staffing its economic 
bureaucracy therefore began at the onset of independence (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). 
During the 1960s, Botswana suffered from a shortage of trained civil servants and 
could not initially run its civil service independently (Wallis, 1989: 52). However, unlike 
other African countries in similar situations, Botswana did not choose to localise its 
bureaucracy immediately to the detriment of meritocracy (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). 
Botswana instead decided to localise its bureaucracy gradually while relying 
extensively on the use of expatriates (Wallis, 1989: 52). Much of the expatriates were 
retained in the Botswana Public Service and assisted in the training of the local cadre 
of bureaucrats (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). Only once local bureaucrats were trained, did 
they assume the positions held by the expatriates (Thovoethin, 2014: 260). In this 
manner, expatriates played a significant role in maintaining the “technical (and 
technocratic) standards of efficiency and effectiveness” and building a competent and 
largely-incorrupt economic bureaucracy (Du Toit, 1995; Thovoethin, 2014: 260; Wallis, 
1989: 52).    
 
Furthermore, Botswana’s economic bureaucracy is able to attract and retain a pool of 
the most talented officials through its Parallel Progression (PP) framework 
(Adamolekun, 1999; Hope, 1995; Thovoethin, 2014: 261). The PP framework is aimed 
at expanding career opportunities for bureaucrats in the technical and professional 
fields by allowing them to advance to higher positions within the civil service along a 
professional, as oppose to an administrative route (Corkery, Ould Daddah, O’Nuallain 
and Land, 1998: 91). The PP framework promotes civil servants on the basis of merit 
and offers them an accompanying 45 per cent salary increase (Corkery et al., 1998: 
92; Thovoethin, 2014: 261). The PP framework also incentivises civil servants to stay 
in their current positions for a period of six to nine years (Corkery et al., 1998: 92). In 
so doing, Botswana’s economic bureaucracy outlines clear career paths for its 
bureaucrats (Tsie, 1998: 13). The PP framework has therefore been successful in 
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attracting and retaining economic bureaucrats despite the steady growth of the private 
sector (Thovoethin, 2014: 261). This is primarily due to bureaucrats being paid the 
equivalent as their counterparts in the private sector (Thovoethin, 2014: 261).     
 
4.1.3. Developmental Success 
Botswana has experienced high economic growth rates since its independence in 
1966 up until today (Fibæk, 2010: 10). Between 1965 and 1974, Botswana’s GDP 
increased from 10 to 22 per cent (Harvey and Lewis, 1990). Rapid economic growth 
during these early years was attributed to a low starting point, the end of a multiyear 
drought in 1965, donor aid and the discovery of diamonds in 1967 and copper-nickel 
in the 1970s (Fibæk, 2010: 5; African Mining, n.d.; Nocera, 2008). Botswana’s 
economic growth thereafter declined slightly between 1975 and 1987 with its GDP 
dropping by eight per cent (Fibæk, 2010: 6). However, it picked up again between 
1978 and 1989 with its GDP increasing by 13 per cent each year (Fibæk, 2010: 6). 
High economic growth rates during that period was attributed to the growth of the 
mining sector as well as the active role which the state assumed in the promotion of 
economic growth and development (Fibæk, 2010: 6).   
 
Botswana’s economic growth from the 1990s up until 2010 can best be described as 
moderate (Fibæk, 2010: 8). The average GDP growth rate between 1990 and 2011 
was 3.4 per cent (United Nations Data [UN Data], 2015). According to Maria Fibæk, 
Botswana’s moderate growth rate was attributed to the 2008/9 global economic crisis 
as well as the change in its economic development strategy, which began focusing 
more on private sector-led development (Fibæk, 2010: 8). Botswana’s economic 
growth rate improved slightly from 2011 to 2014, with an average GDP growth rate of 
4.53 per cent (Trading Economics, 2015a; Kariuki, Abraha and Obuseng, 2014: 2). 
Botswana’s slight increase in its average GDP growth rate was attributed to its service-
oriented industries (Kariuki et al., 2014: 2).  
 
However, Botswana’s over-reliance on its natural resources of diamonds and copper 
nickel and the inability of the country to diversify its economy are presented as threats 
to the continued growth of its economy (Hillbom, 2011: 67; Kariuki et al., 2014: 2). 
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Presently, Botswana’s mining industry constitutes 30 per cent of its GDP and a further 
70 to 80 per cent of its export earnings (Fibæk, 2010: 8). Given that the price of 
diamonds are extremely sensitive to fluctuations in the global market, slight decreases 
in global demand for diamonds have a massive impact on Botswana’s economy 
(Orenstein, 2009: 4). This could be seen in March 2009 when the price of diamonds 
dropped resulting in a negative GDP annual growth rate of 7.9 per cent for the first 
time in Botswana in 40 years (Fibæk, 2010: 8; Daddi, 2013: 13). Compounding this 
problem is the prediction made by experts that Botswana’s diamond reserves are 
expected to depleted by the year 2030 which will result in the GDP per capita falling 
by half by 2050 (The Economist, 2014; The Economist, 2009).    
 
Since its independence, Botswana has made significant strides towards improving the 
overall standards of living of the population (Hillbom, 2011: 84). In this regard, 
Botswana has taken a substantial portion of its mining revenue (a total of 40 per cent 
of its GDP) and invested it in social development (Hillbom, 2011: 84; Fibæk, 2010: 1). 
However, although Botswana is regarded as a middle-income country and in spite of 
its improvements in the social welfare of its population, it scores relatively low in terms 
of its HDI value (Kariuki et al., 2014: 2). As of 2013, Botswana scored 0.683 which 
placed it at 109 out of 187 countries (CountryEconomy.com, 2015). Botswana’s 
relatively poor HDI value is partially a result of the high rate of persons infected with 
HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome) in Botswana which has had a negative bearing on its life expectancy score 
(Kariuki et al., 2014: 2).  
 
The inability of Botswana to redistribute wealth within its country is presented as an 
additional significant social challenge (Hillbom, 2011: 67). Botswana is considered one 
of the most unequal countries in the world, with a national Gini Coefficient of 0.61 last 
measured in 2009 (World Bank, 2015b). Consequently, Ellen Hillbom notes that 
Botswana’s extraordinary economic growth rates accompanied by its growing wealth 
divisions has led to the emergence of a dual society in Botswana in which those 
staying in urban areas tend to benefit from the wealth generated from the mining 
sector, while those living in rural areas, who survive on subsistence farming, are 




4.1.4. Consolidated Electoral Democracy 
 Regular, Free and Fair Elections 
“Against all odds”, Kenneth Good and Ian Taylor argue that Botswana has managed 
to establish an electoral democracy at a time in which much of the African continent 
was under authoritarian rule (Good and Taylor, 2008: 750). Since its first national 
election in 1965, it has held 11 peaceful and successful elections, the latest one was 
conducted in October 2014 (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2010: 65; Potelwa, 2014). 
Botswana has a multi-party political system which has been completely dominated by 
one party, the BDP, having been re-elected into power every election since 
Botswana’s 1965 pre-independence elections (Bauer and Taylor, 2011: 107). In line 
with its constitution, Botswana has conducted regular multi-party elections every five 
years which have been described by observers as “successful” (Sebudubudu, 2010: 
7). In this manner, Botswana has experienced peaceful succession and handover from 
each of the four presidents elected to date (Sebudubudu, 2010: 7).  
 
Although Botswana’s elections have been widely labelled as ‘free’ and peaceful, the 
‘fairness’ of these elections has been questioned by the opposition and has served as 
a contentious issue for both the political opposition in Botswana and analysts alike 
(Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe, 2010: 75). The first concern relates to the monopoly 
that the ruling party has over state media (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). The BDP has 
assumed complete control over state media (such as the “Daily News” newspaper, 
two FM radio stations and “Botswana Television”) through the state-owned Botswana 
Press Agency which it uses to further bolster its image and serve as a mouthpiece 
during election time (World Audit, 2001; Mfundisi, 2005: 175). Opposition parties and 
government critics, however, are not given fair media coverage during the election 
period (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Additionally, although privately-owned media 
outlets have emerged since the mid-1980s, they do not have as much of a broad reach 
as state-owned media, particularly within rural areas, and are heavily censored by the 
government (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 107; Freedom House, 2014). 
 
Secondly, opposition parties and government critics argue that the BDP’s ability to 
better attract funding for its election campaigns has further “created an uneven political 
playing field” and has disadvantaged prospective candidates and opposition parties 
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(Ntib, 2012). This is primarily as a result of the absence of public funding for political 
parties. Botswana’s political parties must therefore rely on their ability to attract private 
funding for their electoral campaign activities (de Jager and Meintjes, 2013: 239). The 
BDP has experienced no difficulty in attracting the needed funding for its electoral 
campaigns from private companies such as De Beers who enthusiastically offer up 
large donations in order to be in the ruling party’s good favour given its diamond mining 
interests with the Botswana government (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Further 
compounding the situation is the fact there are no laws compelling political parties to 
publically reveal their beneficiaries (Mokgosi, 2012: 40; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). 
 
Thirdly, it has been argued that the adoption of the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) 
electoral system implemented by Botswana has further advantaged the BDP 
(Maundeni, Mpabanga, Mfundisi and Sebudubudu, 2007: xvii). The FPTP electoral 
system tends to distort electoral outcomes by favouring established ruling parties 
(such as the BDP), while excluding and marginalising opposition parties within 
parliament (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 108; Molomo, 2004: 63). For example, in 
Botswana’s 1999 general elections, three out of the 12 political parties that ran in the 
elections were represented in parliament (Maundeni et al., 2007: 15). Likewise, in 
2014, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), a coalition formed between the 
Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD), Botswana National Front (BNF) and the 
Botswana People’s Party (BPP), won 30.9 per cent of the vote but only received 14 
seats in parliament (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2014).  
 
 Civil and Political Rights 
According to David Sebudubudu, the protection of individual freedoms and rights has 
been enshrined in Botswana’s constitution (Sebudubudu, 2010: 6). Included in these 
rights is the right of freedom of political association and assembly and the right to vote 
which have been granted to all of Botswana’s citizens since its independence 
(Sebudubudu, 2010: 6 – 7).  
 
 Political Participation 
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Due to the provision made for civil and political rights in its constitution, Botswana 
encourages political participation by allowing any person to vote for, form or join a 
political party of their choosing without any hindrance on the part of the state 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Despite this, Botswana’s opposition parties have 
generally been described as weak and have not posed a formidable threat to the ruling 
party by either challenging it at election times or winning enough seats in parliament 
to hold it accountable (Lotshwao, 2011: 103; Osei-Hwedie, 2001: 57). The leading 
opposition parties in Botswana include the BNF, Botswana Congress Party (BCP) and 
BMD (de Jager and Meintjes, 2013: 238). In comparison to the ruling party, opposition 
parties have generally been smaller and lacked the necessary resources and capacity 
to operate and campaign outside of their regional base (Somolekae, 1998: 9). Other 
factors that have contributed to the weakness of Botswana’s opposition parties 
include: their persistence of radical policies at the expense of winning support from the 
large traditional population; their tendency towards factionalism and divisions; and 
their inability to successfully form lasting alliances with each other (Mtimkulu, 2006; de 
Jager and Meintjes, n.d.: 4).  
 
Despite the fact that Botswana’s constitution provides all persons over the age of 18 
with the right to vote, voter apathy (particularly among the youth) has been an enduring 
characteristic of Botswana’s electoral behaviour since its first election (Selolwane: 
2003). While most people register to vote, they do not end up going to vote at the 
polling stations on the day of elections (Makgekgenene, 2014). For example, in the 
1999 general elections, of the 53 per cent eligible and registered to vote, only 41 per 
cent casted their vote (Makgekgenene, 2014). More recently, in the 2014 general 
elections, while the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) anticipated 1.2 million 
people to register to vote, of the 824 073 people registered, 698 409 actually voted 
(Makgekgenene, 2014; Election Guide, 2015). While an 85 per cent voter turnout is 
an improvement than that of previous years it is important to note that only 55 per cent 
of the voting population actually voted (International Institute for Democratic and 
Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2014a).  
 
 Consolidation of Democracy and Peaceful Succession of Power 
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The above analysis shows that Botswana meets the basic requirements of an electoral 
democracy. However, democracy in Botswana is “shallow in substance” as it has yet 
to be consolidated through alternations in political leadership by way of elections 
(Good and Taylor, 2008: 759). Factors which currently pose a challenge to the 
consolidation of democracy in Botswana (as discussed above) include: an overly-
powerful president, weak opposition parties, voter apathy (particularly among the 
youth), weak independent media outlets, the absence of state funding for political 
parties and an electoral system which distorts the electoral outcome (Good and Taylor, 
2008: 752; Maundeni et al., 2007; Somolekae, 1998). Consequently, Botswana’s 
democracy must still prove itself capable of surviving “genuine political change” 
(Brown and Kaiser, 2007).      
 
4.1.5. Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process  
Since independence, the Botswana government began a process of decentralisation 
of power and responsibilities from central government to local government in an effort 
to enhance good governance (African Development Bank [AfDB], 2009: 11). The main 
objective of Botswana’s decentralised approach was the promotion of popular 
participation within Botswana’s development and governance process (Sharma, 2010: 
135; AfDB, 2009: 11). In this regard, the Botswana government made use of a pre-
existing consultative structure, the ‘kgotla’, as a mechanism to promote popular 
participation (AfDB, 2009:12). The ‘kgotla’ is a traditional court of law within a 
Botswana village where the formulation and implementation of public policies are 
deliberated and all villagers are invited to attend and participate in these discussions 
(AfDB, 2009: 12; Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 11). Botswana’s kgotla system seeks to 
enhance citizen engagement by hosting public meetings which provide a platform for 
debate and questions and answer sessions (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 6). Ministers 
use public meetings as a forum to inform village members of public policies as well as 
the implementation plan (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 6). Therefore, public meetings 
form an important part of Botswana’s policy-making processes as they are used for 




In this manner, the traditional authorities/chiefs, who lead the kgotla, are incorporated 
into local governance structures (Sharma, 2010: 137). They are therefore responsible 
for tribal administration and are tasked with administering justice via the customary 
courts (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 5). According to Keshav Sharma, over 80 per cent 
of Botswana’s cases are tried in customary courts (Sharma, 2009). This is primarily 
because community members prefer to have their disputes settled in customary courts 
where they are more familiar with the manner in which these courts operate (Sharma, 
2010: 137). Chiefs are also tasked with upholding traditional norms and values of their 
people, resolving disagreements, carrying out their ceremonial functions and 
representing their people on matters relating to their culture and traditions at a national 
level (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 5 – 6).   
 
An important improvement within the process of decentralisation was the creation of 
the District Development Committees (DDCs) and the Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) in 1970 (AfDB, 2009: 11). The establishment of the VDCs greatly 
contributed to decentralised local development planning, since it represents the main 
mechanism through which citizens can actively participate in the formulation and 
implementation of village development plans (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 14). The 
village development plans form the building blocks of the district development plans 
which ultimately informs Botswana’s NDPs (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 12 – 13). In 
this manner, individuals at the local level are said to play an active role in Botswana’s 
development process by articulating and agreeing upon their particular village 
development priorities (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 14). The VDCs also function 
according to the pre-existing kgotla system (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 14). The kgotla 
therefore serves as a platform to bring together VDC members, village 
representatives, traditional authorities, district and (where necessary) national 
government officials (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 14). The VDCs also provide a forum 
for members of the village to discuss issues relating to development and raise funds 
that benefits the whole village (Obasi and Lekorwe, 2014: 6). 
 
However, while these mechanisms established are meant to enhance popular 
participation within the Botswana’s development and governance process, they have 
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been described as superficial. According to Lebogang Mokwena and Ebrahim Fakir, 
the channels used to facilitate popular participation in Botswana were not intended to 
promote substantive participation but were rather intended to legitimise development 
planning and governance processes (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 19). For example, 
Mokwena and Fakir argue that the kgotla system fails to fully facilitate broad 
participation because it is prone to elite capture (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 19). In this 
manner, the kgotla systems tends to promote the participation of the privileged 
segments of the village (such as the chief, his advisors and majority ethnic groups like 
the Bakgatla, Barolong and Bakwena) within meetings (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 15 
– 19). Conversely, impoverished villagers, such as women and minority ethnic groups 
(like the Basarwa and the Bakgalagadi), are not given any opportunity to contribute to 
discussions within the kgotla and are consequently marginalised from the consultation 
processes (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 15). 
 
Additionally, members of the village often feel disconnected from local officials: In this 
instance, villagers often complain that their relationship with their elected 
representatives are weak because representatives are often absent during the kgotla 
meetings and do not make an effort to ensure that villagers are included in 
government’s decisions (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 19 – 20). Related to this issue is 
the fact that members of the village often do not know what precisely the roles and 
responsibilities of their elected representatives are (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 20). 
This lack of knowledge on the part of the villagers, significantly detracts from their 
ability to fully engage with the representatives and to effectively contribute to the 
development process (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 20).        
 
Therefore, while there are mechanisms put in place to facilitate popular participation 
within Botswana’s development and governance processes, more needs to be done 
to make these mechanisms more inclusive. It is for this reason that the Botswana 
Democratic Developmental State has not fully achieved inclusive embeddedness.  
 
4.2. Concluding Remarks and Possible Recommendations 
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As shown in the analysis in this chapter, the combination of Botswana’s Development-
Oriented Political Leadership, Effective and Well-Insulated Bureaucracy, 
Developmental Success (in terms of its economic growth and social development) as 
well as its ability to establish a functioning Electoral Democracy has led many 
observers and scholars to label Botswana as a successful African Democratic 
Developmental State. However, with respect to the five outlined benchmarks, 
Botswana’s Democratic Developmental State suffers from several pitfalls: Firstly, 
while it can be said that Botswana is in possession of Development-Oriented Political 
Leadership, due to the enormous power concentrated within the presidency and 
subsequently the inability of state institutions to hold the president accountable, it 
cannot be said that the Botswana’s political leaders act with consensual autonomy.  
 
Secondly, with respect to Botswana’s Developmental Success, although Botswana 
has achieved high economic growth rates coupled with a reduction in poverty and an 
improvement in social welfare, its inability to redistribute the wealth generated 
(particularly to those living in rural areas) has broadened existing inequalities within 
the society. In addition, the spread of HIV/AIDS within Botswana poses another 
challenge to it achieving Developmental Success. The spread of HIV/AIDS has further 
undermined much of the progress which Botswana has made in terms of its health 
indicators and has consequently resulted in a substantial decrease in productivity 
levels (Lewin, 2011: 88). Furthermore, as stated above in this chapter, Botswana’s 
over-reliance in mining and its inability to diversify its economy both pose a significant 
challenge to the continuation of Botswana’s extraordinary economic growth. It has 
therefore been suggested that Botswana grows and develops its other productive 
industries not only to reduce its dependency on mining, but also to facilitate job 
creation and the reduction in social inequality (Meyns, 2010: 56).     
 
Thirdly, while Botswana meets the basic requirements of an electoral democracy, this 
chapter has indicated several challenges which hinders its ability to consolidate 
democracy. Several scholars have provided the following suggestions which may aid 
Botswana in consolidating its democracy. Given the sweeping powers which the 
president enjoys, Mpho Molomo suggests that Botswana should introduce presidential 
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elections in order to make the president more accountable to the electorate (Molomo, 
2000). In order to level the political playing field, Molomo and Gloria Somolekae have 
also suggested that Botswana reform its electoral system to allow for a greater number 
of opposition parties in parliament, provide state funding for political parties, draw up 
legislation which compels political parties to publically declare their donors and create 
an Independent Broadcasting Authority to regulate the media (Molomo and 
Somolekae, 2000: 123). In addition, Dorothy Mpabanga also notes that voter apathy 
can be curtailed through voter education (Mpabanga, 2000: 57).    
 
Lastly, in order to make popular participation mechanisms more effective, both 
Mokwena and Fakir suggest that the kgotla system be transformed so that it is more 
inclusive of minority groups (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009: 21). Additionally, in order to 
strengthen the relationship between local elected representatives and their 
constituents, Sharma suggests that local leaders undergo training in order to 
strengthen their leadership skills so that they are better equipped and provided with a 
clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities (Sharma, 2010: 140). In order to 
perform their functions effectively, local leaders need to form a closer relationship with 
the community that they serve so that they have a better understanding of the 
community’s needs and expectations (Sharma, 2010: 140). Similarly, members of the 
village need to be better informed of the roles and responsibilities of their local elected 
representatives so that they can be better equipped to participate in development and 
governance processes (Mokwena and Fakir, 2009).    
 
Having evaluated Botswana according to the five benchmarks of a Democratic 
Developmental State, it has become apparent that Botswana resembles what Leftwich 
in Chapter Three referred to as an “authoritarian democracy” or a “low intensity 
democracy”: In this regard, Botswana has been more focused on meeting the formal 
criteria of democracy than on ensuring greater public participation and political equality 
(Leftwich, 1998: 66). Similar then to the Dominant-Party Democratic Developmental 
State outlined by Leftwich in the previous chapter, Botswana’s BDP-led government, 
being free from political and social pressures, has had the necessary power and 
autonomy to decisively shape Botswana’s developmental trajectory. 
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Chapter Five: South Africa - Towards a Democratic Developmental State  
5.1. Critical Analysis of South Africa as a Democratic Developmental State 
5.1.1. Development-Oriented Political Leadership 
According to Joseph Ayee, South Africa’s first democratic leader, Nelson Mandela, 
was considered a “Development-Oriented” leader (Ayee, 2013: 265). In this regard, 
Mandela was both committed to socio-economic development and possessed a strong 
developmentalist ideology (Ayee, 2013: 265). However, since Mandela’s term in office, 
South Africa has lacked Development-Oriented Leaders and appears to suffer from, 
“a transformational leadership deficit” (Ayee, 2013: 266). While Mandela’s 
predecessors have claimed to be dedicated to national development, these claims 
have been viewed as a “public relations hoax” which has been used to legitimise and 
further entrench their leadership positions (Ayee, 2013: 266). South Africa’s inability 
to produce Development-Oriented Leaders is related to the following factors as 
defined by Ayee: Firstly, South Africa’s political leadership has often failed to take a 
hard stance on certain unpopular political issues, even though such policy choices 
may have proven to be more practical (Ayee, 2013: 266). For example, South Africa’s 
policy of transformation within government opted for a rapid replacement of white 
employee workers with black employee workers – who lacked the necessary expertise 
(Ayee, 2013: 266).  
 
Secondly, the systemic corruption within government is an additional factor that limits 
the emergence of a Development-Oriented Leadership within South Africa (Ayee, 
2013: 266). While South Africa has established laws and institutions to deal with issues 
of corruption at a national level, the South African government is criticised by its 
citizens for not adequately addressing the challenges of corruption within government 
(Ayee, 2013: 266). The current levels of corruption within the South African 
government are arguably at an all-time high since the end of apartheid (van Vuuren, 
2014: 1). In addition, the current president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, has been 
embroiled in a number of corruption scandals, for which he has managed to avoid 
taking responsibility for (George, 2014). These corruption scandals have included 
among others, the “Nkandlagate” in which President Zuma is alleged to have made 
use of taxpayers’ money for non-security upgrades at his personal home in Nkandla 
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that amounted to R52.9 million; and the “Guptagate” in which permission for a 
commercial plane carrying close friends of President Zuma to land at Waterkloof Air 
Force Base (a military base only and not for commercial landing of aeroplanes) in April 
2013 was allowed (Harding, 2015; George, 2014).  
 
Thirdly, the promotion of patronage on the part of South African political leaders has 
further inhibited the country’s ability to produce Development-Oriented Leadership 
(Ayee, 2013: 267). In this regard, the President’s Office has become, “a conduit for 
patronage”, in which a number of patronage appointments have been made in order 
to grow the size and scope of the presidency (Ayee, 2013: 267). President Zuma, for 
example, has reshuffled his cabinet numerous times over the past years while being 
in office, further expanding the size of his Cabinet with each reshuffle with new 
appointments made on the basis of patronage (Zille, 2012; February, 2014).  
 
Fourthly, political leaders are not able to manage the economy effectively (Ayee, 2013: 
267). For example, the macroeconomic advances made by South Africa has been 
reversed by wasteful spending on the part of political leader’s especially during the 
periods leading up to elections (Ayee, 2013: 267). Wasteful spending has given rise 
to high public debt in South Africa, which the government is finding great difficulty in 
managing (Ayee, 2013: 27). For example, South Africa’s debt-to-GDP ratio has 
steadily risen from 27.8 per cent in 2009 to 46.1 per cent in 2014 (Trading Economics, 
2015c). Linked to these factors is the persistent waste and misuse of state resources, 
which Ayee lists as the fifth factor (Ayee, 2013: 267). The misuse of state resources 
is compounded by the inability of state institutions to hold the offenders to account 
(Ayee, 2013: 267).  
 
The failure of state institutions to hold politicians accountable also extends to that of 
the South Africa president. Although, state institutions and structures in South Africa 
are designed to hold the president accountable (such as parliament, the judiciary, the 
public protector and other commissions), these institutions have been placed under 
immense political pressure due to the politicised manner in which appointments are 
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made resulting in a lack of and an inability to adequately perform their roles and 
functions (Butler, 2011: 5). Given the power that resides within the presidency, granted 
by the South African Constitution, the president is allowed to make a number of 
appointments. These presidential appointments compromise the main functions of 
these key institutions because staff are accountable to the president. Consequently, 
presidential appointments hampers the impartiality mechanisms of these institutions 
to act independently (Gumede, 2015). In particular, the president has the power to 
appoint and also to dismiss (on specified grounds) the heads of key institutions, 
agencies and offices such as those of the Chief and Deputy Chief Justice, the Public 
Protector and the Auditor-General of the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP), the NDPP as well as the commissioners of the IEC (Gumede, 2015; 
Maimane, 2014).  
 
In addition, the inability of parliament to hold the executive branch accountable has 
further compounded the issue and constrained impartiality. The failure of parliament 
to hold the cabinet members and the president individually accountable stems from 
the overwhelming majority of seats which the ANC has in the National Assembly 
(Butler, 2011: 6). The ANC leaders have effectively subjected parliament to the whims 
of the executive, ultimately compromising the separation of powers within the South 
African government (Butler, 2011: 6; Dube, 2015). Consequently, due to the weak 
nature of horizontal accountability, South Africa’s presidents are not held institutionally 
accountable and do not fully operate with the first element of consensual autonomy.  
 
For these reasons, South Africa does not yet have the Development-Oriented 
Leadership necessary for it to effectively pursue the Democratic Developmental State 
model (Ayee, 2013: 267). Consequently, political leadership within South Africa has 
been described by Ayee as “transactional leadership” in which leaders seek to hold 
office with the objective of using state resources to further their individual interests and 
not that of national development (Ayee, 2013: 267).  
 
5.1.2. Effective and Well-Insulated Economic Bureaucracy 
 Presence of a Pilot Agency 
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Post 1994, the new South African government inherited an economic bureaucracy 
which was highly fragmented, unrepresentative and plagued with a tradition of 
departmental autonomy (Makgetla, 2008: 151). Due to the absence of a single central 
planning agency with the power to control departments, the challenges of 
fragmentation and departmental autonomy within the bureaucracy persisted under 
both the Mandela and Thabo Mbeki administrations (Makgetla, 2008: 151). The 
coming into power of the Zuma administration in 2009, however, brought with it new 
developments with regard to planning and coordination within government, one of 
these key developments being the establishment of a National Planning Commission 
(NPC) in 2010 (Kraak, 2011: 350 & 355).  
 
The NPC is a central planning agency housed within the Office of the president (Kraak, 
2011: 356). The NPC represents an advisory body comprising of 26 people appointed 
by the President who largely emanate from outside of the government (Ayee, 2013: 
274; Zarenda, 2013: 2). These 26 people are policy experts who are selected for their 
knowledge in key areas such as finance, industry and rural development, to name but 
a few (National Planning Commission [NPC], 2011: 15). The NPC is responsible for 
development planning, budgeting and public-sector spending, all of which have 
previously been under the jurisdiction of the National Treasury (Besharati, 2013: 12). 
In this regard, the NPC heads South Africa’s medium-term national strategic plan, 
titled, “South Africa Vision 2025” and its comprehensive long-term plan, the National 
Development Plan (NDP) (Kraak, 2011: 356; Besharati, 2013: 13). The NDP was 
endorsed by Cabinet members and adopted by the South African government in 
2012/2013 and includes the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) latest Industrial 
Policy Action Plan (IPAP) as well as the Economic Development Department’s (EDD) 
New Growth Plan (NGP) (Zarenda, 2013: 1; SouthAfrica.info; 2012). 
 
Clearly then, although not explicitly articulated in the literature, the NPC is in a unique 
position to assume the role of the “pilot agency” within South Africa’s Democratic 
Developmental State. The NPC’s position within the presidency coupled with its long-
term economic planning and coordination and budgetary powers allows the NPC with 
the necessary leverage over line departments, and the ability to potentially garner a 
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high degree of internal bureaucratic cohesion and centralisation within South Africa’s 
economic bureaucracy. The NPC is therefore afforded the necessary clout to 
authoritatively penetrate the South African economy and society.  
 
However, due to the inability of the NPC to coordinate the work produced by the EDD 
and the DTI, it has not been able to bring about a high degree of institutional coherence 
within South Africa’s economic bureaucracy. More specifically, the NPC has not been 
able to eliminate the inconsistencies among the NGP, IPAP and the NDP (Khuzwayo, 
2013). One such inconsistency relates to the issue of job creation in which all three 
economic policies disagree on the reasons for South Africa’s dismal unemployment 
rates and how best to remedy the issue of unemployment (Centre for Development 
and Enterprise [CDE], 2013a). Inconsistencies among South Africa’s economic growth 
plans reflect greater divisions and fragmentations within South Africa’s economic 
bureaucracy among its economic departments (Khuzwayo, 2013).  
 
 Insulation of Economic Bureaucrats 
Additionally, the decision to choose commission members for the NPC who (for the 
most part) originate from outside of government has been positive as it has allowed 
commissioners to be effectively shielded from political pressures when formulating the 
long-term economic plans. In this regard, the commissioners are free to make 
decisions not based on political considerations, but rather in pursuit of genuine 
national interests of socio-economic development (Republic of South Africa, 2011: 2). 
Furthermore, the commissioners within the NPC act with consensual autonomy in the 
formulation of long-term economic plans - in that their work is overseen by the 
president and deputy president who are both ex-officio members on the commission 
(Kraak, 2011: 356). In addition, the long-term plans are presented to the Ministerial 
Committee on Planning as well as endorsed by the Cabinet before they can be put 
into effect (Kraak, 2011: 356).  
 
 Social Embeddedness 
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The relative and consensual autonomy of South Africa’s economic bureaucracy is 
further “socially embedded” in a dense network which brings together government, 
organised labour, business and civil society organisations at a national level in the 
form of a collaborative body, namely: the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC) (Houston, Liebenberg and Dichaba, 2001: 17). NEDLAC brings all 
these important actors together in order to consult and deliberate economic and social 
policy (Ayee, 2013: 269). In this manner, NEDLAC has formed a close bond with the 
economic bureaucracy through its relationship particularly with the National Treasury 
and has acted as an important channel linking government with other non-state actors 
in the formulation and coordination of developmental policy (Ayee, 2013: 269).  
 
 Meritocratic Recruitment and Compensation of Economic Bureaucrats 
Since 1994, the South African government has sought to transform the civil service by 
reinstituting the key principal of merit (Naidoo, 2013: 261). In an effort to promote “merit 
and efficiency” within the public service, the South African civil service introduced a 
series of New Public Management (NPM) reforms which included the creation of a 
Senior Management Service (SMS) in 2001 (Ayee, 2013: 270). The SMS comprises 
of civil servants from the four highest employment bracket in the civil services sector, 
which seeks to improve the performance of the civil service by: attracting senior 
managers from outside of the public sector; improving the methods by which 
candidates are recruited, and developing a “service-wide pool of managers” that can 
be placed in any area of the civil service (Cameron, 2010: 686). However, the SMS 
has so far failed to improve the quality of senior managers within South Africa’s civil 
service as many senior managers are still lacking in basic communication and team 
work skills (Cameron, 2010: 686; Naidoo, 2015: 33).  
 
Furthermore, the SMS has been unsuccessful in attracting and retaining senior 
managers due to the large number of vacant senior management positions (Naidoo, 
2008: 122; Naidoo, 2015: 33). High vacancy rates particularly at the SMS level within 
key economic departments such as the National Treasury, EDD and DTI demonstrate 
that this trend is evident within South Africa’s economic bureaucracy. In 2013, the 
vacancy rate within the National Treasury stood at 11.1 per cent and 14 per cent within 
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the EDD (Republic of South Africa. Parliament. Public Service and Administration and 
Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committees, 2013; South African Press 
Association [SAPA], 2013; Republic of South Africa. Parliament. National Council of 
Provinces [NCOP] Economic and Business Development Committee, 2013). Similarly 
vacancy rates within the DTI stood at 9.4 per cent in 2014 (Department of Trade and 
Industry [DTI], 2014: 41). According to Edigheji, the high rates of vacancies and staff 
turnover within economic departments can be attributed to the inability of the South 
African economic bureaucracy to adequately compensate senior managers according 
to private sector rates (Edigheji, 2007: 24). Following the introduction of the 
Employment Equity Act, Edigheji argues that black senior managers have often been 
drawn to the private sector where they can manage to obtain a higher salary (Edigheji, 
2007: 24).  
 
Despite ushering in a series of reforms designed to promote the values of merit and 
efficiency, South Africa’s civil service is still viewed as being “highly politicised” 
(Naidoo, 2013: 271). The politicisation of the South African bureaucracy post-1994 
has occurred largely as result of pressures placed on the newly-democratic ANC 
government to transform the bureaucracy from one which was previously heavily 
dominated by white civil servants under the apartheid regime, to one which reflects 
the demographics of a non-racial and democratic society (Cameron, 2010: 687; 
Naidoo, 2013: 265). Moreover, the politicisation of the South African bureaucracy has 
largely been owed to the introduction of the ANC’s Cadre Policy and Deployment 
Strategy in 1997, which strongly advocated for the appointment of senior civil servants 
from within the ANC’s sphere of influence (Cameron, 2010: 687).  
 
The ANC has justified its use of cadre deployment on the basis that they need “loyal 
party hands” in the top echelons of the civil service (Twala, 2014: 159). In this manner, 
the ANC’s cadre deployment strategy has ultimately replaced the principle of merit 
with that of “party” loyalty (Naidoo, 2013: 266). Additionally, because the ANC’s cadre 
deployment strategy failed to incorporate administrative competence within its 
recruitment criteria, many of the cadre appointees lack the necessary managerial skills 




5.1.3. Developmental Success 
In 1994, South Africa’s newly-elected democratic government inherited a weak 
economy, which suffered from deeply-embedded structural weaknesses evident in its 
declining growth rate, rising inflation and decreasing investment from the previous 
decade (Faulkner and Loewald, 2008; Goldman Sachs, 2014; Knight, 2004). However, 
since 1994, South Africa’s economy has experienced moderate economic growth and 
has been classified by the World Bank as an upper middle-income country (Nnadozie, 
2013: 81). Between the period 1994 to 2014, its average GDP growth rate was 3.15 
per cent, which showed a marked improvement from the average growth rate of 1.4 
per cent achieved from 1980 to 1994 (Industrial Development Corporation [IDC], 2013: 
1; World Bank, 2015a). In particular, from 2005 to 2007 South Africa’s total GDP 
growth rate exceeded 5 per cent year-on-year (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur and Ncube, 
2014: 2). This three-year period (2005, 2006 and 2007) was the most impressive 
growth experienced since 1994, when the ANC took over the reins as the new 
government (Bhorat et al., 2014: 2). The moderate economic growth is a result of the 
structural transformation which the economy was subjected to (Bhorat et al., 2014: 3). 
In this regard, the South African economy was transformed from a previously 
resource-dependent economy to one which is characterised by a vibrant and globally 
competitive financial and business services sector (Bhorat et al., 2014: 3). 
 
However, following the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, South Africa’s GDP growth 
rate fell to an all-time low of -6.10 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 (Bhorat et al., 
2014: 2; Trading Economics, 2015b). Due to the after-effects of the 2008/2009 global 
financial crisis compounded with the South African government’s inability to address 
structural problems (such as widening inequalities, unemployment, crime, corruption 
and a lack of infrastructure), South Africa has experienced mediocre economic growth 
with an average GDP growth of 2.05 per cent from 2008 to 2013 (Trading Economics, 




Since 1994, the South African government has gone to great lengths to improve the 
quality of life for all of its citizens (Ngcaweni, 2013). However, in spite of the 
achievements made with respect to the provision of basic services, South Africa has 
been unable to redistribute the wealth generated equally among the population. In this 
manner, gross inequality, particularly across racial boundaries, has been cited as an 
enduring feature of South Africa’s new democratic dispensation (Bhorat et al., 2014: 
13). South Africa has one of the highest Gini Coefficients in the world: In 2006, South 
Africa’s Gini Coefficient measured at 0.67, decreasing slightly to 0.65 in 2009 and 
remaining there through to 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2014: 35).  
 
South Africa’s HDI value for 2013 was 0.658 which located it at 118 out of 187 
countries and placed it within the medium development category (United Nations 
Development Programme [UNDP], 2014). South Africa’s HDI score has increased 
slightly from 0.569 in 1980 to 0.658 in 2013 which represents an overall 15.6 per cent 
increase (UNDP, 2014). However, South Africa’s progress within the area of human 
development over recent years has been minimal. For example, South Africa’s HDI 
value only increased by 2.4 per cent between 2010 and 2013 (Gumede, 2014: 13; 
UNDP, 2014).  
 
5.1.4. Consolidated Electoral Democracy 
Despite being on the verge of a civil war and the possible outbreak of an intractable 
racial conflict in 1993, South Africa managed to successfully transition from apartheid 
to a non-racial multiparty democracy (Maphunye, 2014: 140; Hart, 2013; Inman and 
Rubinfeld, 2013: 1). South Africa’s remarkable political transition to democracy has 
been heralded as one of the most important political occurrences of the last century 
(Inman and Rubinfeld, 2013: 1). South Africa’s political transition to democracy 
brought with it the end of an apartheid system of racial discrimination, which excluded 
the black majority people from participating in political life and granted democratic 
rights to all persons of colour (Brooks, 2004: 4). The success of South Africa’s 
transition lay in the fact that it was peacefully negotiated between all three key actors 
(the NP, ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP]) and that the democratic pact 




 Regular, Free and Fair Elections 
South Africa’s first national elections, based on universal franchise, was held on 27 
April 1994 (Glaser, 2001: 223). The ANC walked away from the first National Assembly 
election as the clear takers, and won 62.65 per cent of the vote and used their victory 
to solidify and anchor their position as the dominant party within South Africa’s new 
multi-party democracy (Glaser, 2001: 223; Wieczorek, 2012: 27). Since 1994, South 
Africa has conducted regular national elections every five years (in years 1999, 2004, 
2009 and 2014) (Africa, 2013: 2). In contrast to much of Africa where legitimate 
elections are rare, South Africa stands out for conducting regular, free and fair 
elections at the polls, which has been supervised by the IEC (Africa, 2013: 1; Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2014a: 1).  
 
Following the ANC’s rise to power in the 1994 general elections, the ANC has 
dominated elections having received the majority of votes irrespective of the party’s 
performance (Wieczorek, 2012: 30). National elections have therefore been seen 
within South Africa’s democratic dispensation as “entirely predictable” with the ANC 
facing no serious opposition or threat at the polls. The ANC was able to win 66.4 per 
cent of the votes in 1999, 69.7 per cent in 2004, 65.9 per cent in 2009 and 62.2 per 
cent in 2014 (Wieczorek, 2012: 30; de Kadt and Hudson, 2014: 7; Media Club South 
Africa, 2014; Freedom House, 2015; McGroarty and Maylie, 2014). 
 
 Civil and Political Rights 
The Constitution of South Africa makes provision for both civil and political rights within 
the Bill of Rights (Mbazira, 2006: 1). The Bill of Rights is regarded as the “cornerstone” 
of South Africa’s democracy and emphasises, “the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 
chap2). Civil liberties outlined in the Bill of Rights include, among others, the right to 
life, personal autonomy and individual rights, freedom of movement, freedom of 
association, freedom of expression and beliefs (Mbazira, 2006: 1; Freedom House, 
2015). According to the Bill of Rights, political rights refer firstly to the freedom of 
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individuals and to make political choices which includes: “the right to form a political 
party; to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for a political party; and to 
campaign for a political party or cause” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996: chap2). Secondly, the Bill of Rights encompasses the right of every South 
African to regular, free and fair elections (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996: chap2). Thirdly, the Bill of Rights provides every South African over the age of 
18 with the right to a secret vote and to run and stand for public office (Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996: chap2).  
 
 Political Participation 
Since South Africa’s advent of democracy, it has experienced very good electoral 
participation rates (Africa Governance, Monitoring and Advocacy Project [AfriMAP] 
and Open Society Foundation for South Africa [OSF], 2006: 7). Voter turnouts for 
South Africa’s past general elections have been on par with those countries in Western 
Europe and considerably higher than other African countries (AfriMAP and OSF, 2006: 
7). Voter turnout for South Africa’s general elections have been as follows: 86.87 per 
cent in 1994, 89.28 per cent in 1999, 76.73 per cent in 2004, 77.30 per cent in 2009 
and 73.48 per cent in 2014 (IDEA, 2014b). According to Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, 
assessing the percentage of voter turnout over the past 20 years in terms of the 
proportion of eligible voters reveals a more accurate reflection of electoral participation 
in South Africa (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b: 2). In this manner, statistics indicate that 
voter turnout has decreased from 86 per cent in 1994 to 57 per cent in 2014 (Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2014b: 2).These results therefore indicate a growing number of eligible 
voters within South Africa who do not participate during elections (Schulz-Herzenberg, 
2014b: 2).       
 
According to Meshay Moses, the use of the Proportional Representation (PR) system 
by South Africa allows for the promotion of healthy electoral competition by aiding the 
establishment of political parties (Moses, 2012: 1). The number of registered political 
parties in South Africa has grown over the years from 70 in the late 1990s to 152 in 
2014 (Booysen and Masterson, 2009; Moses, 2012: 1; Freedom House, 2015). The 
substantial increase in the number of registered and contesting political parties shows 
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that South Africans’ right to form political parties and run for elections has been 
exercised (Moses, 2012: 1). Currently, South Africa’s main opposition party is the 
Democratic Alliance (DA), followed by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the 
IFP having each won 22.23, 6.35 and 2.40 per cent of the vote in the 2014 general 
elections, respectively (Freedom House, 2015; Independent Electoral Commission 
[IEC], 2015).  
 
However, despite the proliferation of political parties within the new democratic 
dispensation, opposition parties in South Africa have been characterised as weak and 
fragmented (Moses, 2012: 1). Overall, opposition parties have underperformed during 
election time and have been unable to effectively challenge the ruling party (Moses, 
2012: 2). Reasons for the weakness of opposition parties in South Africa include: “a 
lack of strategy, ideological weaknesses, insufficient funding and low campaign 
resources, and poor party image and leadership” (Moses, 2012: 3). Due to these 
challenges, Moses notes that it is unlikely that any one opposition party will replace 
the ruling party in the near future (Moses, 2012: 1).   
 
 Consolidation of Democracy and Peaceful Succession of Power 
As can been seen, then, while South Africa meets the basic requirements of an 
electoral democracy, it has yet to undergo changes in government by way of elections 
(Welsh, 2004:14). While the ANC’s single-party dominance has managed to secure 
political stability during its tricky transition period to democracy in 1994, its dominance 
in parliament coupled with a weak and fragmented opposition are presented as two 
major challenges to the achievement of true democratic consolidation in South Africa 
(Welsh, 2004; Kearsey, 2007).   
 
5.1.5. Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process 
The increase in popular participation and the growing number of interest groups 
involved in development and governance processes as well as the establishment of 
institutional mechanisms and channels for popular participation since 1994 
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demonstrates the promotion of participatory democracy within South Africa’s new 
democratic dispensation (Houston and Liebenberg, 2001: 1). South Africa’s vast range 
of institutional mechanisms further illustrates its commitment to participatory 
processes, which transcends regular elections (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 1). Key 
institutional mechanisms and channels for popular participation which have been 
created since 1994 include: public hearings, petitions, “Izimbizo”, Green and White 
Paper processes, public access to parliamentary portfolio committee meetings, 
integrated development planning (IDP) processes and ward committees (Houston and 
Liebenberg, 2001: 1; The Presidency, 2008: 7 – 9; Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 105 – 
110). 
 
Firstly, concerning public hearings, Imraan Buccus and Janine Hicks note that the 
public is invited to public hearings in which they are encouraged to provide formal input 
necessary to refine bills and public policy (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 105). However, it 
has been noted that participation at public hearings has been minimal, with many 
community members not attending meetings (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 105 – 106).  
 
Secondly, the use of petitions as a mechanism for participation involves the 
submission of petitions by members of the community to a petition-standing committee 
(Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 108). The committee is then tasked with assessing the 
petition and, where necessary, petitions are forwarded to the appropriate government 
departments (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 108). However, the committee has been 
regarded as being negligent in its response to forwarding petitions, particularly 
petitions on issues concerning the most vulnerable such as HIV/AIDs, youth and 
women groups (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 108),  
 
Thirdly, the “izimbizo” is another form of public gathering which was launched in 2001 
(The Presidency, 2008: 8). The izimbizo usually convenes at the provincial and local 
level of governments (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109). It is led by the premier and seeks 
to bring together several thousand community members with representatives from 
governmental departments (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109). Members of the 
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community are then invited to raise questions pertaining to service delivery, the 
formulation of by-laws and the budget to which departmental representatives are 
obliged to respond and resolve (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109; Hicks, 2009: 6). While 
popular during Mbeki’s term as president, the number of convened izimbizo-style 
gatherings has decreased over the years as a result of poor organisation (Buccus and 
Hicks, 2011: 108). Additionally, due to the sheer size of these gatherings, the izimbizo 
has been criticised for being too large to facilitate meaningful deliberations (Buccus 
and Hicks, 2011: 109).  
 
Fourthly, South Africans are also encouraged to engage in policy making processes 
by commenting on green and white papers (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109). Green and 
White Papers are published in the government gazettes and distributed among 
important interest groups and stakeholders for input and comment (Buccus and Hicks, 
2011: 109). However, Green and White Papers are riddled with technical and legal 
terms which make it difficult for a layperson to read and understand (Buccus and Hicks, 
2011: 109). They are also not available to all citizens in their local languages and are 
not widely distributed among the communities, but only reserved for certain 
stakeholders and groups (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 109 - 110). 
 
Fifthly, citizens are also invited to attend national and provincial parliamentary portfolio 
committee meetings (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 106). However, while the invitation has 
been extended to the public, they are not overtly encouraged by government to attend 
and participate within portfolio committee meetings because the details (such as the 
time, date and venue) and records of these meetings are not always been made 
available to the public timeously (Buccus and Hick, 2011: 106).  
 
Sixthly, the IDP is one of the main participatory mechanisms which operate at the level 
of local government (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110). IDPs are drawn up every five 
years and are used by municipalities as a planning method to formulate and coordinate 
area-wide, long-term development plans (Lewis, Ochola, Singh and Dlamini, 2014: 
23). According to local government legislation, each municipality is required to interact 
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directly with their constituents in the formulation of IDPs (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 
110). However, the manner in which municipalities are required to consult with 
members of the community in the formulation of IDPs is not explicitly outlined in the 
legislature and therefore various approaches are adopted across the board with 
varying degrees of success being achieved (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110).   
 
Lastly, ward committees are another key participatory mechanism which has been 
introduced at the local level since 1999 (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110; The 
Presidency, 2008). Ward committees have been created with the aim of connecting 
community members with municipal representatives and involving them within 
municipal processes such as the formulation of a ward IDP and municipal decision-
making (Hicks, 2009: 5; Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110). Ward committees are headed 
by a ward councillor and comprise of a diverse group of ten people who serve an 
advisory function to the ward councillors. (Hicks, 2009: 6). However, ward committees 
are constrained by numerous barriers: they are often susceptible to political influence 
and manipulation, lack the capacity and resources to effectively carry out their roles 
and do not convene regularly for meetings (Hicks, 2009: 7). Furthermore, there is a 
lack of clarity as to how the work of ward committees is meant to inform development 
planning and decision-making within municipalities (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 110). In 
this manner, ward committees are generally used by ambitious members of the 
community to spring-board into lucrative careers in politics (Buccus and Hicks, 2011: 
110).  
 
As has been shown, since South Africa’s advent of democracy in 1994, it has radically 
transformed itself from one which was previously “secretive and authoritarian” to one 
which welcomes popular participation within its development and governance 
processes (Houston, Liebenberg and Dichaba, 2001: 71). While South Africa’s 
participatory mechanisms suffer from several limitations, South Africa’s commitment 
to popular participation is entrenched in its constitution and is further evident in the 
various institutional mechanisms which shows that the South African government has 




5.2. Concluding Remarks and Possible Recommendations 
The above critical analysis of South Africa’s Emerging Democratic Developmental 
State has outlined that, firstly, since Mandela’s term in office, South Africa has been 
unable to produce Development-Oriented Leaders. While political leaders have 
publically asserted their commitment to socio-economic development, they have been 
corrupt, wasteful and have used their positions to further parochial interests. 
Furthermore, due to a heavily ANC-dominated parliament with an immense amount of 
power concentrated in the presidency, the president has acted with little consensual 
autonomy. According to the Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa, Dikgang Moseneke, 
the drafters of the Constitution, with the euphoria of the moment, eagerly gave former 
president Nelson Mandela sweeping powers that allowed him to make appointments 
without constraints in the presidency and justified these actions by arguing that, “He 
(Mandela), after all, will do the right thing” (Gumede, 2015). The drafters of the 
Constitutions, according to Gumede, naively believed that Mandela’s predecessors 
would not abuse or misuse their powers and also act and take on the same attributes 
as their predecessor and always “do the right thing” (Gumede, 2015). However, given 
the systemic corruption within government as well as the number of patronage 
appointments made to grow the size and scope of the presidency, this has not been 
the case. In an effort to make the president more accountable to democratic 
institutions, Moseneke has called for the review of presidential powers (SAPA, 2014). 
While Moseneke acknowledges that curbing executive powers will be a challenging 
task, he argues that it must be undertaken over the next 20 years in order to safeguard 
South Africa’s democratic project (SAPA, 2014).  
 
Secondly, while South Africa’s economic bureaucracy has achieved consensual 
autonomy, authoritative penetration and social embeddedness, it lacks institutional 
coherence and is highly politicised. In order to produce greater institutional coherence 
within the economic bureaucracy, Anthony Butler suggests that more power needs to 
be centralised within the NPC and in the presidency to allow for improved decision-
making and to more adequately guide South Africa’s developmental trajectory (Butler, 
2014). In so doing, Butler notes that the present power and autonomy of Cabinet 
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members and director-generals needs to be curbed as to allow for the NDP, through 
the NPC, to take centre stage in South Africa’s developmental project (Butler, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, the South African government has recently emphasised the need to 
address the political-administrative interface by depoliticising the civil service (Ayee, 
2013: 272). In this regard, the South African government has acknowledged that 
progress towards the establishment of a Democratic Developmental State can only be 
achieved once the economic bureaucracy is able to operate autonomously outside the 
purview of politics (Ayee, 2013: 272). This point has been raised in the NDP which 
argues that, “political deployment needs to be replaced by a focus on building a 
professional public service that serves government, but one that is also sufficiently 
autonomous and sufficiently insulated from political patronage” (Republic of South 
Africa, 2011: 365).  
 
Thirdly, while South Africa has taken great strides since 1994 to structurally transform 
its economy, rampant unemployment, crime, corruption, a lack of infrastructure (such 
as hospitals, school buildings, power, efficient transport systems and water) and the 
inability of the government to redistribute wealth generated from its moderate 
economic growth are major obstacles that South Africa has yet to overcome if it is to 
truly achieve Developmental Success.  
 
Fourthly, although South Africa has successfully transitioned into a democracy by 
meeting all the requirements of an electoral democracy, it has yet to be consolidated 
through changes in political leadership achieved via the ballot box. Given the ANC’s 
single-party dominance coupled with a weak and fragmented opposition, scholars 
such as Roger Southall have characterised South Africa as a “low intensity 
democracy” (Southall, 2003: 74).  
 
Fifthly, despite the numerous obstacles affecting participatory mechanisms, this 
chapter has demonstrated that great strides have been taken by the South African 
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government in order to entrench participatory democracy in South Africa. However, 
the mechanisms for popular participation in South Africa’s development and 
governance processes need further strengthening so that the government can be 
more effective. In this regard, this chapter observes that South Africa has to a certain 
extent achieved inclusive embeddedness.  
 
Despite South Africa’s intention to construct a Democratic Developmental State, this 
chapter has also shown that after just over two decades (between 1994 and 2015) 
South Africa has made little progress in achieving a Democratic Developmental State. 
Therefore, while South Africa’s dominant-party democracy arguably has the 
necessary “power, authority, autonomy, continuity and political capacity” to pursue 
socio-economic development, its lack of Development-Oriented Political Leadership 
since Mandela’s term in office as well as its inability to establish an Effective and Well-
Insulated Economic Bureaucracy has meant that the South African state has not been 
able to successfully guide its developmental trajectory (Leftwich, 1996; 290). As a 
result, South Africa has a long road ahead of it if it is to successfully transition from an 
















Chapter Six – Conclusion: 
In light of the growing consensus around the need for the emergence of Democratic 
Developmental States in Africa, this thesis sought to assess the concept within two 
Southern African countries: Botswana and South Africa. Given Botswana’s depiction 
of and South Africa’s public commitment to the establishment of a Democratic 
Developmental State, this thesis has done so by highlighting five key benchmarks of 
a Democratic Developmental State and thereafter analysing the extent to which 
Botswana and South Africa have exhibited these benchmarks.  
 
Firstly, in setting out the conceptual and theoretical framework, Chapter Two noted 
that the concept of the Developmental State was coined by Johnson 1982 and has 
been used to refer to states that have achieved rapid economic growth and 
development through the intervention of strong, efficient bureaucracies. In this 
manner, this thesis has drawn on the work of Leftwich in defining the Developmental 
State as one which has the necessary power, autonomy and capacity to guide and 
pursue developmental goals. Thereafter, Chapter Two discussed the accompanying 
theory of the Developmental State. In so doing, it noted that the theory of the 
Developmental State emerged during the late 1980s and early 1990s as a critique of 
the neoliberal account of the East Asian Miracle. In this regard, Chapter Two showed 
that while neoliberal economists argued that the success of East Asia’s post-war 
industrialisation resulted from the ability of the market to function free of undue state 
interference, developmental theorists claimed that it was precisely the role of the 
played by an active, interventionist state in directing development which accounted for 
its economic success. Furthermore, Chapter Two drew again from the work of Leftwich 
(2000) in outlining the following six features of the Developmental State model: 
incorrupt political and bureaucratic elite; embedded autonomy; effective and well-
insulated bureaucracy; weak and subordinated civil societies; the capacity to 
effectively manage private economic interests; and a compilation of repression, poor 
human rights track records, legitimacy and performance.  
 
Secondly, Chapter Two addressed the concept of the Democratic Developmental 
State by noting that it is founded on the premise that the concepts of democracy and 
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development are complementary. In this regard, it has adopted the definition of 
substantive democracy defined as a set of institutional procedures which aim to 
include citizens within the political process. Development has been defined in Chapter 
Two as not only the pursuit of material wealth but also that of social objectives, such 
as the reduction in inequalities and poverty as well as the provision of individual safety, 
which all necessitate state involvement. 
 
Thereafter, Chapter Two discussed the relationship between democracy and 
development and showed that while democracy was considered to be inconsistent 
with development during the 1960s up until the 1980s, this world view was replaced, 
following the decline of authoritarianism, with the notion that democracy is not only 
compatible with development, but also with the Developmental State model. Lastly, 
Chapter Two defined the Democratic Developmental State as one type of 
Developmental State which promotes “holistic development” by simultaneously 
pursuing both economic and democratic development. Furthermore, this chapter has 
noted that Democratic Developmental States seek to uplift its citizens out of poverty 
by forming alliances not only with private sector interests (as in the case of the 
Developmental State) but that of the entire society within the developmental process.   
 
Chapter Three briefly surveyed the literature produced on the Democratic 
Developmental State and outlined five benchmarks of such a model. The chapter 
began firstly by assessing Sklar’s concept of ‘developmental democracy’. In 
reconciling the concepts of democracy and development, this chapter has noted that 
Sklar’s concept of ‘developmental democracy’ regards democracy as a means by 
which national development is to be achieved. Furthermore, it has noted that Sklar’s 
‘democracy in parts’ argument advocates for an incremental approach to the adoption 
of democracy with the realisation of a Democratic Developmental State being the end 
goal.  
 
Secondly, this chapter considered Leftwich’s contribution to the topic whereby he 
asserts that the success of any Democratic Developmental State lies in its ability to 
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effectively reconcile the conservative prerequisites of democratic consolidation within 
the radical logic that necessitates rapid economic growth and development. The 
manner in which a Democratic Developmental State is able to reconcile democratic 
consolidation with the logic of economic growth, Leftwich argues, gives rise to two 
broad categories of Democratic Developmental States: Dominant-Party and 
Coalitional Democratic Developmental States. In a Dominant-Party Democratic 
Developmental State, preference is given to economic growth, while in Coalitional 
Democratic Developmental State conditions of consolidated democracy is favoured 
above that of economic growth.  
 
Thirdly, Chapter Three noted that White and Robinson’s contribution to the literature 
on the Democratic Developmental State argues that the only way in which the 
concepts of democracy and development can be made compatible in the long-term is 
through the construction of an effective Democratic Developmental State. Such a state 
model, they argue, has the ability to create a “virtuous spiral” between socio-economic 
development and political development and can only be realised through conscious 
institutional alterations to the state apparatus. Thereafter, this chapter has outlined 
and discussed White’s five key features of a Democratic Developmental State, 
namely; consensual autonomy, social embeddedness, inclusive embeddedness, 
institutional coherence and authoritative penetration.  
 
Fourthly, Chapter Three assessed Edigheji’s contribution to the literature on the 
Democratic Developmental State in which he advocates for the adoption of such a 
model in Africa. The Democratic Developmental State model is viewed by him as 
having the potential to address Africa’s severe democratic and developmental issues. 
For Edigheji, a Democratic Developmental State should incorporate elements of both 
procedural and participatory democracy and pursue socio-economic objectives such 
as the eradication of poverty and social inequalities, provision of individual safety and 




Having surveyed the contributions made by the five key authors, Chapter Three 
arrived at the following five benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State: 
Development-Oriented Political Leadership; Effective and Well-Insulated Economic 
Bureaucracy; Developmental Success; Consolidated Electoral Democracy; and 
Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process. The remainder of 
the thesis (Chapter Four and Five) has been dedicated to the critical analysis of 
Botswana and South Africa as Democratic Developmental States by using the five 
benchmarks outlined in Chapter Three. In this regard, this thesis found that neither 
Botswana nor South Africa exhibit all five benchmarks of the Democratic 
Developmental State model as outlined.  
 
In critically analysing the extent to which Botswana can be regarded as a Democratic 
Developmental State, Chapter Four found that while Botswana exhibits the features 
of Development-Oriented Political Leadership, an Effective and Well-Insulated 
Bureaucracy, Developmental Success (in terms of its economic growth and social 
development) and a functioning Electoral Democracy, it suffers from several pitfalls: 
Firstly, its presidents are not held institutionally accountable. Secondly, it has been 
unable to diversify its economy, redistribute wealth and curb the spread of HIV/AIDs. 
Thirdly, it has been unable to consolidate its democracy. Fourthly, Botswana’s popular 
participation mechanism in the form of the kgotla system has marginalised 
impoverished groups from its development and governance processes.  
 
In order for Botswana to meet all five of the outlined benchmarks of a Democratic 
Developmental State, Chapter Four made the following recommendations: Firstly, it 
has suggested that Botswana diversify its economy in order to reduce its dependency 
on mining and facilitate job creation and the reduction in social inequality. Secondly, 
in order for democracy to be consolidated and for Botswana’s parliament to pay a 
more effective role in holding the president accountable, it has suggested that 
presidential elections be introduced, that the political playing field be levelled in order 
to afford equal opportunity for all parties contesting in elections and that voter apathy 
be reduced through voter education. Thirdly, in order to enhance popular participation 
mechanisms, the chapter suggested that the kgotla system be transformed, that local 
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leaders undergo training in order to strengthen their leadership skills and form closer 
bonds with their constituents, and that members of the village be better informed of 
the roles and responsibilities of their local elected representatives.  
 
In critically analysing the extent to which South Africa has successfully been able to 
construct a Democratic Developmental State, Chapter Five found that South Africa 
has made very little progress in this regard: Out of the five benchmarks, this chapter 
showed that South Africa only partially exhibits the features of an Effective and Well-
Insulated Economic Bureaucracy, Developmental Success, Electoral Democracy and 
Popular Participation in the Development and Governance Process. In this manner, 
this chapter showed that factors which have inhibited South Africa’s realisation of a 
Democratic Developmental State have been: an absence of Development-Oriented 
Political Leadership coupled with an overly-powerful president; a weak pilot agency 
and a highly-politicised economic bureaucracy; its inability to address structural 
problems such as widening inequalities, unemployment, crime, corruption and a lack 
of infrastructure; its inability to consolidate its democracy; and a need to strengthen its 
existing popular participation mechanisms.  
 
Furthermore, Chapter Five made the following recommendations which South Africa 
can adopt in its effort towards constructing a Democratic Developmental State: Firstly, 
in order to hold the president institutionally accountable, this chapter has suggested 
that the president’s powers be reviewed and, where possible, curbed. Secondly, in 
order to ensure greater institutional coherence within the economic bureaucracy, this 
chapter has suggested that more power be centralised within the NPC so that it can 
better coordinate the work of other economic departments and guide South Africa’s 
developmental trajectory. Thirdly, the chapter recommended that political deployment 
within the economic bureaucracy be replaced by meritocratic recruitment in order to 
build an autonomous, professional and effective economic bureaucracy which is 
insulated from political patronage. Fourthly, the chapter suggested that South Africa 
address its structural challenges of widening inequalities, unemployment, crime, 
corruption and a lack of infrastructure in order to generate high economic growth. 
Fifthly, Chapter Five recommended that South Africa address the weaknesses inherit 
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in its popular participation mechanisms in order for it to fully achieve the feature of 
inclusive embeddedness.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that while Botswana exemplifies most of the five 
outlined benchmarks of a Democratic Developmental State, South Africa still has a 
long to go if it is to transition from an Emerging/Aspirational into a fully-fledged 
Democratic Developmental State. In this manner, both Botswana and South Africa can 
take comfort in Sklar and White’s assertion, noted in this thesis, that the successful 
construction of a Democratic Developmental State will occur gradually, over a period 
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